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This study investigates the HBS effect in a panel of nine CEECs during 1993:Q1-
2003:Q4 (unbalanced panel). Prior to estimating the model, we analyze several key
assumptions of the model (e.g. wage equalisation, PPP and sectoral division) and
elaborate on possible consequences of their failure to hold. In the empirical part of the
paper, we check the level of integration of the variables in our panel using the Pedroni
panel-stationarity tests. We then investigate the internal and external version of the
HBS effect with the Pedroni panel-cointegration tests as well as by means of group-
mean FMOLS and PMGE estimations to conclude that there is a strong evidence in
support of the internal HBS and ambiguous evidence regarding the external HBS. Our
estimates of the size of inflation and real appreciation consistent with the HBS effect
turned out generally within the range of previous estimates in the literature (0-3 % per
annum).  However, we warn against drawing automatic policy conclusions based on
these figures due to very strong assumptions on which they rest (which may not be met
in near future). Finally, following the hypotheses put forward in the literature, we
elaborate and attempt to evaluate empirically the potential impact of exchange rate
regimes on the magnitude of the HBS effect. 
Niniejsze opracowanie bada efekt HBS w 9. krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
(EŚW) w okresie 1993:Q1-2003:Q4 (panel niezrównoważony). Przed estymacjami
modelu, analizujemy kilka kluczowych założeń modelu (np. o wyrównywaniu się płac,
parytecie siły nabywczej czy o podziale sektorowym) i zastawiamy się nad
potencjalnymi konsekwencjami ich niespełnienia. W części empirycznej sprawdzamy
stopień integracji zmiennych w naszym panelu wykorzystując panelowe testy
stacjonarności Pedroniego. Następnie badamy wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny efekt HBS za
pomocą panelowych testów kointegracji Pedroniego oraz estymacji metodami group-
mean FMOLS oraz PMGE, które dostarczają silnych dowodów na istnienie
wewnętrznego HBS, ale nie dają jasnych wyników co do zewnętrznego HBS. Nasze
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Abstract
szacunki skali inflacji i realnej aprecjacji związanej z efektem HBS okazały się zbliżone
do wcześniejszych szacunków innych autorów (0-3% w skali rocznej). Przestrzegamy
jednak przed automatycznym wykorzystywaniem tych szacunków w polityce
gospodarczej, gdyż są one oparte na bardzo mocnych założeniach (których spełnienie
nie jest pewne w bliskiej przyszłości). Na końcu zastawiamy się nad hipotezami, które
pojawiły się w literaturze przedmiotu, zakładającymi potencjalny wpływ reżimów
kursowych na skalę efektu HBS oraz podejmujemy próbę empirycznego oszacowania
tego wpływu. 
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Since the beginning of the transition process, Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) have experienced relatively high inflation rates and substantial appreciation of their
real exchange rates. While in the early 1990s, inflation was mainly reflecting price
liberalisation, sizeable adjustments of administrative prices and monetary overhang – the
legacy of the socialist system1 – the inflation performance in recent years can no longer be
attributed to those early-transition phenomena. It is widely argued that the positive inflation
differential and trend appreciation of currencies in CEECs vis-à-vis most Western economies
may be explained (at least to some extent) by structural factors. The Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson (HBS) effect, which links the inflation differential and real exchange rate
movements to productivity growth differentials, gained a prominent role among these factors. 
The HBS theory offers a supply-side explanation of higher inflation and the associated real
exchange rate appreciation in countries experiencing higher relative productivity growth.
In its domestic version relative inflation in a given economy is explained by relative
productivity growth between the tradable and nontradable sectors. It has been observed
for some time that the tradable sector usually enjoys higher productivity growth than the
nontradable sector (for example, in Baumol and Bowen, 1966). If wages equalise between
sectors, higher productivity-driven wages in the tradable sector push wages in the
nontradable sector above levels commensurate with its productivity gains. This in turn
drives prices of nontradables up and raises the ratio of nontradable to tradable prices. In
a two-country setting the HBS effect predicts that the country with higher sectoral
productivity-growth differential will experience higher relative inflation (or, higher
absolute inflation levels if tradable inflation differential is assumed to be zero). 
In the international context the causal link between relative productivity and relative prices can
be further used to explain real appreciation of the exchange rate of a country with higher
7
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1 Monetary overhang was built over the years in the form of forced savings across socialist economies as a
result of pervasive shortages and rationing of goods and services.
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relative productivity growth. Assuming that the law of one price holds in the tradable sector,
the productivity-driven inflation differential will result in appreciation of the real exchange rate
deflated with any measure of inflation containing the tradable and nontradable component.  
Therefore, in view of the fact that each of the three effects related to the HBS theory (rising
relative productivities, relative prices and real appreciation of exchange rates) has been
observed in the CEECs, it is not surprising that the HBS hypotheses have attracted a lot of
attention in the regional context. Higher growth rates of real GDP and productivity in
CEECs are to some extent a natural consequence of the transition from highly regulated
economies, where productive resources were employed in less than fully efficient manner,
closer to their natural level. Another plausible hypothesis is that the process is triggered by
convergence, where growth rates differentials ensue from large income and productivity
disparities between the region and its Western European neighbours and are facilitated by
their progressively closer economic integration. While substantial gains in this process have
been achieved already, there still seems to be a sizeable room for convergence and the
relative productivity growth differentials are expected to persist for many years in the future.
Additionally, as a consequence of the EU accession of eight CEECs as well as the debate
on the adoption of the euro, the HBS theory has become a popular framework used for an
assessment of the feasibility of meeting the Maastricht criteria. It has been argued that
simultaneously setting the ambitious inflation and exchange rate stability criteria, as is the
case in the Maastricht Treaty, might be in conflict with the underlying trend of productivity
growth. The posited inappropriateness of combining the two criteria stems from the
general prediction of the HBS theory that certain productivity growth differentials can
result in violating any joint criterion on inflation and nominal exchange rate. The
productivity-driven excess inflation and real appreciation should be viewed as a natural
equilibrium process in faster-growing economies which in principle does not call for
policy intervention. Thus, investigation of the HBS effect in transition economies is of a
key importance from the point of view of EMU accession. An evaluation of this effect can
shed empirical light on potential problems associated with meeting the Maastricht
criteria. It can also provide guidance in choosing the central parity and managing the
exchange rate in the ERMII period.
Related to the question of meeting the joint inflation-nominal-exchange-rate criterion is the
issue of the posited trade-off between nominal convergence implied by the Maastricht
criteria and the real convergence manifested by the GDP catch-up. The problem might arise
in the new EU Member States (NMS thereafter), if the inflation and nominal exchange rate
consistent with the Maastricht criteria are impossible to achieve in the presence of the
sizeable HBS effect. A monetary tightening that might be necessary to bring inflation (or
exchange rate) to the Maastricht-consistent level could also suppress real growth.
Consequently, there would be a risk of sacrificing the real convergence for the nominal one. 
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The high policy relevance of the above-mentioned issues has spurred interest in empirical
research of the HBS effect in CEECs. The existing literature contributions differ
considerably in their methodological approaches as well as country and time coverage.
While most of them detect that the HBS effect is indeed at work in CEECs, they usually
conclude that observed inflation differential and a real exchange rate appreciation is only in
small part explained by the HBS effect. Additionally, the estimates of the HBS-consistent
inflation and real appreciation differ considerably suggesting the productivity-driven real
appreciation in the range of 0-3% per annum. 
Against this background, we seek to reassess the HBS model for CEECs and to contribute to
the empirical literature on this topic. The HBS theory rests on restrictive assumptions and
their violation can be one of the factors explaining the fragility of empirical estimates. In the
presented study we undertake a detailed investigation of the extent to which several key
assumptions of the HBS theory (such as wage equalisation or PPP) hold in our panel.
Subsequently, we verify the HBS hypotheses using quarterly panel data for nine CEECs
during the period 1995-2003. In doing so, we include two alternative versions of the sectoral
division and various alternative definitions of key model variables. This is motivated by
theoretical controversies and practical problems related to dividing the economy into
tradable and nontradable sectors as well as by robustness checks. In addition to estimating
the internal and external versions of the HBS model we enhance the policy usefulness of these
estimates by calculating the size of the HBS-consistent inflation and real appreciation. Finally,
following the hypotheses put forward by Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) and Egert et al. (2003)
we elaborate and evaluate empirically the potential impact of exchange rate regimes on the
magnitude of the HBS effect. 
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows. In the second chapter we present a
theoretical exposition of the model. Chapter three contains a concise literature review
related to HBS effect covering both the selection of early papers from the 1970s and 1980s
as well as recent empirical studies devoted specifically to CEECs. Chapter four presents the
data used in empirical analysis as well as the results of stationarity tests of the data. In the
fifth chapter we investigate the extent to which assumptions of the HBS theory are met in
our sample. In particular, we focus on wage equalisation, PPP and the issue of proper sector
division. In addition, we elaborate on the possible consequences of violation of these
assumptions for both the theoretical analysis of the HBS model and its empirical evaluation.
Chapter six presents panel-cointegration tests and estimations of the internal and external
versions of the HBS by means of panel regressions. Subsequently, inflation and appreciation
consistent with the HBS effect are computed and discussed in the context of their usefulness
for inference about the near future (e.g. the EMU membership). The seventh chapter
discusses the hypothesis of the potential impact of exchange rate regimes on the HBS effect
and presents an attempt of its empirical verification. Chapter eight concludes.
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Initiated by Harrod (1939) and formalised independently by Balassa (1964) and
Samuelson (1964), the HBS theory posits a relationship between sectoral productivity
differentials across countries and patterns of deviations from PPP (i.e., the fact that,
abstracting from transition costs, prices of identical goods measured in one currency are
not empirically the same across countries, either continuously or over significantly long
periods) in order to investigate the implications of such deviations for international real-
income comparison. Over the years, however, the processes predicted by the HBS theory
have been extensively modelled in studies, which seek to explain the behaviour of real
exchange rates. The formal exposition of the HBS model is presented below.2
It is assumed that a small open economy produces two goods: composite traded and
composite nontraded and that outputs are generated with constant–return production
functions (CRS): 
(1) YT= AT F(KT, LT)  and YNT= ANT F(KNT, LNT)
where subscripts T and N denote tradable and nontradable sectors, respectively.
Parameters A, K and L with T and N superscripts assigned stand for productivity, labour
and capital in the two sectors in question. Assuming that both goods are produced the total
domestic labour supply is constant and equal to L = LT+ LN.
It is further assumed that capital is mobile across sectors and countries (i.e. there are no
resource constraints on capital), but labour only domestically. Labour mobility ensures
that workers earn the same wage W in either sector, where the numeraire is the traded
good (i.e. relative wage). Perfect capital mobility implies that the domestic rate of return
10
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(1996).
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on capital R is fixed to the world interest rate and is exogenous. If R is the world interest
rate in terms of tradables, then, under perfect foresight, R must also be the marginal
product of capital in the tradable sector. At the same time R must be the value, measured
in tradables, of marginal product of capital in nontradable sector (for details see Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996)). Under the assumption of a perfect capital mobility, the production
possibilities frontier of an economy becomes linear and therefore technology is the unique
determinant of relative prices of tradables in terms of nontradables (PNT/PT).
Thus, the profit maximisation in tradable and nontradable sectors implies:
(2a) R = (1-γ) AT {KT / LT}-γ and
(2b) R = (PNT/PT)(1-δ) ANT{KNT/ LNT}-δ
(3a) W= γAT {KT / LT}1-γ and
(3b) W = (PNT/PT)δANT{KNT/ LNT}1-δ
where γ and δ are labour’s share of income generated in the traded and nontraded sector,
respectively.
Equations (2a&b)-(3a&b) fully determine the relative price of tradables to nontradables
with an important implication that for a small country, the relative price of T and NT is
independent of consumer demand patterns. But introducing a nontradable good into the
analysis is not enough to violate the theory of absolute PPP. If the two countries had
identical production functions and capital was perfectly mobile, prices of nontradables
expressed in terms of tradables would equalise. According to the HBS effect, what causes
persistent deviation of real exchange rate from its PPP values are differences in sectoral
labour productivity. 
By log differentiating (2a&b)-(3a&b), a systematic relationship between relative
productivity shifts and the internal real exchange rate (i.e., the price of nontradable good
expressed in terms of tradable goods) can be derived:
(4) ∆(PNT/PT) = ∆pNT - ∆pT = (δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT
Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows: provided that the inequality δ/γ>=1 holds,
faster productivity growth in the tradable relative to nontradable sector will push the price
11
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of nontradables upward. If both sectors had the same degree of labour intensity (δ=γ),
then the change in relative prices would be equal to the productivity growth differential.
The larger the share of labour in the production of nontradables relative to tradables
(δ>γ), the larger the effect will be. This is the so-called ‘domestic’ version of HBS effect
and was first introduced by Baumol and Bowen (1966) who looked at historical data of
industrialised countries and found that technological progress in service-intensive goods
was smaller than in traded-manufactured goods. However, as Froot and Rogoff (1994)
argue, the Baumol-Bowen effect is not a sufficient condition to imply the international
HBS effect.
The ‘international’ version of the HBS effect rests on the assumption that the PPP holds in
the tradable sector. The aggregate price level p (in the logarithmic form) can be
decomposed into prices of tradables and nontradables (at home and abroad) with weights
α and 1- α, where ‘*’ denotes a foreign country:  
(5a) p = α pT + (1 – α)pNT and
(5b) p* = α*pT* + (1 – α*)pNT*
The real exchange rate q is the relative price of tradables produced abroad (measured in
domestic currency) with respect to home produced tradables (again, all variables are
expressed in logarithms), e represents a nominal exchange rate (and is defined in domestic
currency units per foreign currency so that a decrease implies appreciation):
(6) q = (e + p*) – p
Now, substituting both equations (5a&b) into (6) and expressing the result in terms of
changes, we obtain:
(7) ∆q = (∆e + ∆pT* – ∆pT) + [(1 – α*)(∆pNT* – ∆pT*) – [(1 – α)(∆pNT – ∆pT)] 
If the law of one price for tradables holds,
(8) ∆pT = ∆e + ∆ pT* 
then by substituting (4) into (7) and using (6) and (8) one can show how the real exchange rate
can shift in a response to sectoral productivity changes between home and foreign country:
12
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(9a) ∆pT - ∆pT*= ∆eT + (1 – α)[(δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT] – (1 – α*)[(δ*/γ*)∆aT*- ∆aNT*] 
or equivalently:
(9b) ∆qT = ∆eT + ∆pT* - ∆pT = -{ (1 – α)[(δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT] – (1 – α*)[(δ*/γ*)∆aT*- ∆aNT*]}
Again assuming that δ/γ>=1 holds (at home and abroad), faster productivity growth in
tradable relative to nontradable sector at home than abroad will lead to a rise in the
relative price level and therefore to the real appreciation of the domestic currency. As is
the case with the ‘domestic’ version of the HBS effect, equation (9a&b) implies that
demand plays no role in determining the relative price and therefore the real exchange
rate.3
At this stage, it is worth mentioning that there are other theories that try to explain the so-
called ‘Penn-effect’, i.e., the tendency for PPP-based real-income comparisons to be
systematically biased (Asea and Corden, 1994). These depend largely on assumptions
regarding demand.  For example, Kravis and Lipsey (1983) and Bhagwati (1984), building
on imperfect capital mobility, heterogenous tastes and factor endowments between
countries, draw a conclusion that is the same as the one drawn from the basic HBS effect. 
13
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3 Given that we can expect a large number of individual tradable goods (i.e. T1 and T2) we can extend the
HBS model to the more general case in which there are additional factors of production (for example
skilled and unskilled labour) without invoking demand restrictions. This is the case because for demand
to have no role in determining relative prices, the perfect capital mobility is essential administracyjnych.
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This chapter provides an overview of the literature investigating both the PPP puzzle and
real exchange rate behaviour in the HBS framework. To provide a more complete research
perspective the chapter distinguishes between the general literature on the HBS effect and
its applications to CEECs.  
Drawing on the early work of Ricardo and Harrod, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)
point to the fact that divergent international productivity levels could, via their effect on
wages and domestic prices of goods, lead to permanent deviations from the absolute version
of PPP due to Cassel (1916). In his seminal paper, Balassa tests the relationship between
price levels and GDP per capita and finds a positive relationship between countries’ income
and prices. This positive relationship leads him to conclude that this is why the cost-of-living
PPP tends to bring about a spurious overvaluation of currencies of higher income countries.
He further states that if international productivity differences are greater in the production
of tradables than in the production of nontradables, the currency of the country with high
productivity increases will be overvalued in terms of PPP. Consequently, the ratio of PPP to
the exchange rate will be an increasing function of income. 
Thus, the HBS theory is an appealing and relatively simple theoretical explanation of
trends in real exchange rates.4 A pertinent question is therefore how useful an explanation
of trends in relative prices and real exchange rates the HBS theory really is?
Unfortunately, empirical studies are rather inconclusive and many of them point to the
limitations of the theory offering competing rationalisations. Also, arguing that demand
shifts affect the composition of output, many researchers add additional variables to the
basic HBS model. It should be born in mind however that, as an anecdote states “while
all models are wrong, some are useful”. This question is the main motivation behind
extensive empirical literature discussed concisely below. 
The 1980s studies of the HBS effect confirm that it is indeed at work. Hsieh (1982) verifies
14
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4 Obstfeld (1993) develops a formal model in which real exchange rates contain a deterministic trend.
CASE Reports No. 57
3. Empirical Studies
the existence of the HBS effect using the time-series approach Focussing on determinants
of the real exchange rate in Germany and Japan against their respective trading partners
between 1954 and 1976, Hsieh finds that the productivity-differential variables are
significant and have the correct sign. Martson (1987) uses OECD data and calibrates a
model of the yen/dollar real exchange rate over the years 1973 to 1983. His findings
confirm that labour productivity differentials between traded and nontraded sectors play
a positive role in explaining the long-run trend appreciation of the yen against the dollar.
HBS studies of the early 1990s detect a somewhat more tentative evidence of the link
between productivity disturbances and real exchange rates. Froot and Rogoff (1991) do
not find a strong support for the traded-goods sector productivity growth differential and
the real exchange rate movements across EMS countries for years 1979 to 1990. Also, Ito
et al. (1997), who assess the validity of the HBS model for a number of ASEAN countries,
find that although there is some evidence that these countries move in the direction
indicated by the HBS effect, the real exchange rate did not appreciate or appreciated only
slightly. Furthermore, they cannot find support for the assumptions behind the HBS effect
including the law of one price in the tradable sector or the pattern of nontraded versus
traded price movements consistent with the evolution of the real exchange rate.
The notable exception is a study by Heston et al. (1994) who, working with the extended
data developed by Gilbert and Kravis (1954),5 find strong HBS effects across countries
and time (i.e., the difference between prices of nontradables and tradables changes
with income). Canzoneri et al. (1999) – another exception – test a panel of 13 OECD
countries using FMLS estimator. They divide their study into two parts: first they test
the ‘domestic’ version of HBS, and then look at the crucial assumption of the PPP in
the traded sector. Their results show that the relative price of nontraded goods indeed
reflects the relative labour productivities in the traded and nontraded sectors.
However, the evidence is somewhat mixed when it comes to PPP in the traded sector.
Although, PPP seems to hold when DM exchange rates are examined, it shows large
and long-lived deviations when US dollar exchange rates are considered.6
A further range of studies point out that real exchange rates could be affected by other real
and macroeconomic factors than the HBS mechanism. In terms of these studies, the HBS
effect, real interest rate differentials (i.e., interest rate parity), net foreign assets (in
portfolio balance models), government spending, and GDP per capita all, individually and
together, play a role in determining real exchange rates. 
15
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5 Originally, it was Gilbert and Kravis (1954) who developed price level measures for common baskets of
goods across countries. 
6 It should be noted in general that it is somewhat difficult to compare the results of these kinds of studies.
This is because the empirical literature includes a wide range of approaches to explain the HBS
hypothesis, and very often departs from its basic Ricardian framework.
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For example, Asea and Mendoza (1994) apply a dynamic-general-equilibrium model to
disaggregated data for 14 OECD countries between 1975 and 1990 in which they explicitly
take into account tastes, technology and endowments. They do it in order to take into
account microeconomic factors specified in the original formulation of the HBS model in
the Ricardian framework. Their results support the proposition that sectoral differences in
productivity growth help explain the trend rise in relative prices of nontradables within
OECD countries. However, they find less empirical support for the overall HBS effect –
i.e., there is little evidence that long-term differences in the level of the real exchange rate
reflect differences in the relative price of nontradables. 
De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) base their study on a sample of 14 OECD countries from
1970 until 1985 to examine the joint effect of productivity differentials and terms of trade
movements on a real exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables. The main
purpose of the joint analysis is to solve the omitted variable problem. They also show how
their results are affected if the key assumption relating to international capital mobility is
lifted. They find that productivity differentials across sectors are very significant
determinants of real exchange rate fluctuations, but not of changes in the relative price of
nontradables (terms of trade changes are significant in both cases). Furthermore, they
include real income per capita and government spending in their specification. As these
regressors capture demand effects and come out highly significant, De Gregorio and Wolf
(1994) question the perfect capital mobility assumption of the HBS effect.7
The HBS effect: CEECs focus.
Even if the HBS effect was originally developed to unveil the PPP puzzle, equation (9) is
crucial to the better understanding of why the currencies of CEECs appreciate in real
terms once these economies liberalise their markets and why the relative tradables
productivity growth differentials between  the NMS and the euro area might lead to
structurally higher inflation once they lock their central parities to the euro.    
Table 1 presents the differences in results of the key studies of the HBS effect in CEECs
and describes the estimation methods applied.
Jakab and Kovacs (1999) use a structural VAR model on Hungarian data over 1993 to
1998 to test the hypothesis that the real exchange rate appreciation in transition
economies reflects productivity gains in the tradable sector (they use the real effective
exchange rate as a measure of real exchange rate). They find a strong support for the HBS
effect amounting to about 2.9 percentage points per year. This result could speak against
the EMU participation. For example, sustaining a stable nominal exchange rate could
result in the inflation rate of 2.9 percentage points above that of the euro area. 
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7 For other examples see also Bergstrand (1991), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Balvers and Bergstrand (1997),
Chinn (1997).
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Cipriani (2000) focuses on structural inflation rather than exchange rates in his study on
the HBS effect. He examines a panel of ten CEECs between 1995 and 1999 using quarterly
data. The dependent variable in the estimated regression is the relative price of
nontradable goods (i.e., he measures the Baumol-Bowen effect). Cipriani (2000) concludes
that productivity growth differentials between tradable and nontradable sectors are not
substantial, and argues that it can only explain around 0.7 percentage point of observed
inflation. 
De Broeck and Slok (2001), test the presence of the HBS effect in the two groups of
transition countries: 1) the EU accession countries and 2) the other transition countries.
They use the Pooled Mean Group estimator (PMGE) – due to Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)
– and test the impact of different productivity measures in the tradable and nontradable
sectors on the real effective exchange rate during the period 1991 and 1998. The tradable
sector is proxied by industry and construction, while nontradable - by services. However, in
order to control for macroeconomic development, which can also cause real exchange rate
disturbances, they include additional variables like agriculture productivity, broad money,
openness, government balance, terms of trade, and the index of fuel and nonfuel prices. The
result of their analysis provides a clear evidence of the HBS effect in the NMS, with
somewhat less evidence in other transition countries, Russia and other former Soviet Union
countries. They suggest that further income catch-up will be associated with further
appreciation of the real exchange rate of around 1.5% per annum. Unfortunately, their use
of trade-weighted exchange rates calculated by the IMF is problematic because trading
partners continue to change over time and include countries from outside the euro area.
Moreover, the very short time span of annual data and a large number of explanatory
variables makes the quality of the PMGE estimation questionable. 
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) modify the HBS model so that it is more relevant to
transition countries. They achieve this by adding demand side variables and argue that it
is the catching-up process (i.e., real convergence) that largely drives economic growth in
these countries. They provide direct estimates of the HBS effect for all the transition
economies for the period 1991 to 1999 using the methodology developed by De Gregorio
et al. (1994). As there are many missing observations, they estimate the HBS effect using
fixed and random effects, OLS and GLS regressions for an unbalanced panel. Their results
confirm the presence of the HBS effect, of the magnitude of 3 percentage points per
annum. The important contribution of Halpern and Wyplosz study is that they distinguish
between different exchange rate regimes in the HBS model.8
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8 For the broader discussion on Halpern and Wyplosz study see chapter 7.
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Egert (2002) studies the HBS effect in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Using quarterly data between 1991:Q1 and 2001:Q2, he applies time series and
panel cointegration techniques as well as panel group means FMOLS estimator of Pedroni
(2001) to test the presence of the HBS effect in those five countries. In addition, he
quantifies the impact of the productivity growth differential on overall inflation, and
investigates the extent to which it can explain real exchange rate appreciation in the
CEECs. He concludes that while the HBS effect seems to be at work and does lead to the
real appreciation of currencies, it does not endanger the fulfilment of the Maastricht
inflation criteria by theses countries – somewhat in contrast with the previous studies. The
drawback to Egert’s study is that he assumes zero productivity growth in the nontradable
sector. This assumption may be too strict given rapid (and unequal across countries)
productivity growth in the service sector after its suppression during the central planning
(see IMF, 2001). Also, he uses Germany as a proxy for the entire euro area, which may
further bias his results.
Egert et al. (2002) explore Egert’s (2002) hypothesis about the impact of the regulated
prices on the magnitude of the HBS effect. Using Pedroni panel cointegration techniques
they estimate the HBS effect in nine CEECs. They focus on a sample spanning from 1995
to 2000 to eliminate the early phase of the transition period, since, in their view, price and
productivity developments during that time were mainly driven by initial reforms and not
by the HBS effect. Similarly to Egert (2002), they are able to detect that productivity
growth in the traded goods sector is likely to bring about nontradable inflation. However,
they argue, it is not obvious that these gains will automatically cause overall inflation to
go up and cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. This in fact depends on the
composition of the CPI basket (i.e., the lower the share of nontradables, the lower will be
the impact of relative price on overall inflation) as well as the share of the regulated prices.
Furthermore, they cannot find support for PPP in the traded sector. Summing up, their
results suggest that the role of the HBS effect in the price level convergence might be
limited and that other factors may be important as well.
The conclusion drawn from the studies investigating the HBS effect in CEECs is that
although there is a clear and strong evidence for the long-run relationship between the
relative productivity growth and the relative price of nontradables (i.e., high productivity
growth in tradable sector brings about relative price inflation), the evidence for the
relative productivity differential and related movements in the real exchange rate is
somewhat mixed. The most recent studies (see De Broeck-Sløck (2001) and Egert (2002))
tend to be more cautious in their estimates and conclude that the HBS effect is likely to
cause the real exchange rate appreciation of around 1.5% per year. This is in sharp
contrast to the previous works that detected the HBS-consistent annual real exchange rate
appreciation of 3% or more. There are probably a few reasons that can explain differences
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in estimates. All of these studies employ different econometric techniques and rest on
different assumptions (i.e. proxies used for tradable and nontradable sectors, measures of
productivity, assumptions about productivity increases in the nontradable sector, nominal
exchange rate deflators, etc.). Also, some of them only measure the domestic version of the
HBS effect (i.e. the Baumol and Bowen effect); some additionally try to detect demand-
side effects. It should be stressed that more recent studies are probably more reliable as
they are based on additional observations and therefore render more accurate results.
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4.1. Data Sources and Definitions
Given the exposition of the HBS model and its variants (see chapter 2), their estimations
require data on relative prices, relative productivity, and real exchange rates. For this
purpose the tradable and nontradable sectors must be defined. Motivated by practical and
theoretical considerations of the sectoral division, two alternative definitions of the
tradable sector are adopted: 
1)with the subscript ‘1’ where the tradable sector comprises industry only, i.e. sections
C, D and E of the NACE9 classification of the economic activity (mining and
quarrying, manufacturing industries as well as electricity, gas and water supply),
2) with the subscript ‘2’ where the tradable sector comprises industry as well as
agriculture, forestry and fishing, i.e. sections A, B, C, D and E of the NACE
classification of the economic activity.
As far as the nontradable sector is concerned, we use a single definition which includes
the part of the economy complementing the second definition of tradables, i.e. all sectors
except agriculture, fishing, forestry and industry. In line with this division, all remaining
variables have two variants: one in which the tradable sector is consistent with definition
1), and the second consistent with definition 2). The complexity of sectoral division at an
empirical level will be discussed in more detail in section 5.1.
The data analysed in this study come from various sources. We use quarterly data series
with different initial and final observations for various series. Most series, however, start
in 1994-1995 and end in 2003. The choice of the sample period was motivated both by data
availability and by the conscious decision to eliminate observations from the early 1990s
that reflect mostly early transition phenomena rather than long-run relationships (such as
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9 NACE  is the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community compatible with ISIC - the
International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities.
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4. Presentation of the Data
the HBS effect). The data on quarterly Gross Value Added (GVA) and employment by
sectors (both in current and constant prices) are taken from Eurostat. In cases of gaps in
the Eurostat database we turned to alternative sources. For employment data we used
CANSTAT10 and prior to 2000 – CESTAT11 while GVA data was sourced from national
statistical offices. For data on the CPI and PPI we used the IMF IFS database, while for
exchange rates and nontradable component of the CPI we used the OECD Main Economic
Indicators database. Whenever these databases had gaps, we used the data from national
statistical offices.
Since it is impossible to calculate total factor productivity (TFP) in our sample, we proxy
it with average labour productivity: 
(10) PRO_Ti_xxx= PRO_NT_xxx=
– average labour productivity in the tradable and nontradable sectors 
where VA_Ti_xxx and VA_NT_xxx stand for GVA in constant prices in the tradable (i=1 or
2) and nontradable sectors for a given country (xxx) while EMP_Ti_xxx and EMP_NT_xxx
represent total employment in respective sectors of the same country. Sectoral
productivities serve as a basis for calculating relative productivities:
(11) PROi_xxx=
where i refers to the type of sectoral division and takes on values 1 and 2. Relative
productivitiy differential, denoted as RPROi_xxx are defined as a ratio of relative
productivities in the CEECs and the euro area.  
Further, we define three versions of relative price indices:
(12) RPi_xxx = ,  where i=1 or 2
(13) RP3_xxx =
xxxPPI
xxxNTCPI
_
__
xxxPTi
xxxPNT
_
_
xxxNTPRO
xxxTiPRO
__
__
xxxNTEMP
xxxNTVA
__
__
xxxTiEMP
xxxTiVA
__
__
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10 CANSTAT- the Quarterly Bulletin of Candidate Countries complied by statistical offices of the 8 new EU
member states as well as Bulgaria and Romania. 
11 CESTAT is the comparative quarterly bulletin of Visegrad countries, Romania and Slovenia.
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where: PTi_xxx – value added deflator for tradables,
PNT_xxx – value added deflator for nontradables,
CPI_NT_xxx – CPI prices of services (national definitions),
PPI_xxx – producer price index (industry excluding construction).
And finally, below we define the euro real exchange rate in three ways, deflated by the
deflator of GVA (RER1), by the CPI (RER2) and by the PPI (RER3): 
(14) RER1_xxx= 
(15) RER2_xxx= 
(16) RER3_xxx= 
where: EUR_xxx – nominal euro exchange rate12 in country xxx (domestic
price of a unit of the euro),
DEF_xxx – Gross Value Added deflator for country xxx,
CPI_xxx – the Consumer Price Index for the country xxx,
PPIM_xxx – the PPI in manufacturing for the country xxx.
The comprehensive information on all names, definitions and sources of variables used in
this study are available in Appendix 1.
4.2. Data Description
Figures 1-3 present developments of several indicators of interest for nine CEECs:
Bulgaria (BUL), the Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Latvia (LAT),
Lithuania (LIT), Poland (POL), Slovakia (SLK) and Slovenia (SLO). Additionally Figures
1-2 depict series for the euro area (EUR). The presented series are transformed into
logarithms, seasonally adjusted (with the use of the software Demetra), and then scaled
with the base period equal to 2003:Q4 (figures 1 and 3) and 2002:Q1 (Figure 2).
xxxPPIM
EUPPIxxxEUR
_
_*_
xxxCPI
EUCPIxxxEUR
_
_*_
xxxDEF
EUDEFxxxEUR
_
_*_
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12 An increase in the exchange rate means a depreciation of domestic currency. The euro exchange rate prior
to 1999 refers to the synthetic euro exchange rate as calculated by the ECB. 
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Table 2 and Table 3 present average annual percentage changes of various indicators
subsequently used in the empirical part of the paper. The data presented in the table have
been based on the ‘raw’ series, i.e. prior to log transformation and seasonal adjustment. 
Figure 1 presents relative productivity indices, which in line with theoretical predictions of
the HBS model, have been on the rise in most CEECs. Due to the generally low share of
agriculture in gross value added, the extent of the increase in relative productivities is very
similar for both variants of sectoral division and across most countries with the exception of
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. This follows from the greater significance of agriculture in
generating gross value added in these countries. In Bulgaria, both measures of relative
productivity are extremely volatile. In terms of trends, if only industry is considered tradable,
one can speak of a slight increase in relative productivities; when agriculture is added to the
tradable sector, the trend relative productivity has actually been falling since 2000. In
Romania, developments in relative productivities calculated using the sector division of type
1 points to a gradual increase of relative productivity during 1998-2001 and a slight fall
afterwards, while productivities calculated using the sector division of type 2 suggest a stable
(or slightly falling) relative productivity during 1998-2000, and an increase during 2001-
2003. Slovakia presents yet another case: both relative productivity measures are highly
volatile, but when smoothed out, point to a stable relative productivity growth. 
Relative price indices (Figure 2) have been on the rise for the majority of CEEC during
most of the analysed period. For most countries, the definition that exhibits the highest rise
is the RP3, i.e. the ratio of price level of services to the PPI. This is particularly
pronounced in Estonia (1993-1998), the Czech Republic (1994-2001), and Slovakia (1995-
1999). Figures also point to the slowdown of relative price growth in recent years (with an
exception of Slovakia where the opposite trend is observed). 
As the theory suggests, real exchange rates (Figure 3) have visibly appreciated over the past
several years. This trend is particularly pronounced in countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. In most countries, in line with declining
inflation, the pace of real appreciation has slowed down in recent years and in some of
them (e.g. Poland, Latvia and the Czech Republic) the period 2002-2003 saw a nominal and
real depreciation.
4.3. Unit Root Tests
Before we proceed to the estimation of the HBS model, we examine our dataset by
performing standard tests for unit roots. In line with subsequent analysis, we carry out
these tests in the panel framework.
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The presence of unit roots is checked by the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS) as well as Levin
and Lin (LL) tests. The versions of tests used in our analysis (including the set of critical
values) are based on procedures proposed by Pedroni (1999)13. Methodological details on
both tests are given in Appendix II. It is worthwhile mentioning that the main difference
between those tests is that under the alternative hypothesis, the IPS requires only some of
the series to be stationary, while the LL test requires all of them to be stationary (Harris
and Sollis, 2003).  
Results of both tests are presented in Table 4. Tests were performed on levels transformed
into logarithms and after seasonal adjustment for specifications with and without trend
(both with a constant).
Most series turned out nonstationary in levels. This result is robust to the inclusion of a
trend for all seven price indicators (deflators, CPI and PPI). In the case of specifications
with a trend, some tests point to the rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for
all productivity indicators and the euro exchange rate (and the PPI in the case of the IPS
test). Thus, the tests are inconclusive in the case of these variables. However, visual
inspection of the productivity measures as well as analogous tests applied to the same
indicators by other authors (for example, Egert et al., 2003),14 lead us to conclude that all
(or most) variables are nonstationary in levels. This conclusion motivates an examination
of cointegration presented in section 6.1.
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13 We are grateful to Prof. Pedroni for providing us with RATS codes for his panel procedures.
14 Egert et al. (2003) perform the IPS test on a similar set of variables in levels and first differences and
conclude that all series follow nonstationary processes.
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The internal and external transmission mechanisms of the HBS model rest on several
restrictive assumptions that were discussed in chapter 2. These assumptions include
among others: perfect capital mobility across countries and sectors, free sectoral labour
mobility implying economy-wide wage equalisation and the PPP in the tradable sector. On
a practical level, an important assumption is a clear division of the economy into two
sectors: one producing a composite good which is perfectly tradable in the world markets
and the other that produces a nontradable good sold only in domestic markets. Thus, any
attempt to empirically verify the HBS effect, necessitates not only testing basic assumption
underlying the model, but also calls for the division of the economy into two such sectors.
However, at a practical level this is hardly possible and the assumption of two distinct
sectors of tradables or nontradables is typically violated as well.
In this chapter we take a closer look at the key assumptions of the HBS theory which may
not be met in practice and elaborate on possible implications of their violation for the
theory and estimations of the HBS effect. We commence with the sector division
assumption, then consider the wage equalisation assumption and finally conclude with the
discussion of the PPP assumption.
5.1. Sector division and measurement of prices
5.1.1. Sector division
The HBS theory distinguishes between two separate sectors: one fully open to foreign
trade facing externally determined prices (tradables), and one sheltered from foreign
competition and producing for the domestic market at prices that are determined
domestically (nontradables). As equations (1) through (9) all involve variables
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5. Empirical verification of the basic
assumptions of the HBS model
(productivities, wages and price levels) that refer to either of the sectors, a clear and
precise sectoral division becomes a very central assumption of the HBS theory. 
Therefore, any empirical study, aiming to verify the HBS effect, will inevitably have to
address this issue in more detail and make some important judgments. In this section we
intend to highlight some consequences of problems related to defining the two sectors and
the possible impact of these problems for empirical estimation of the HBS effect.
The actual division of the real economy into the tradable and nontradable sectors is a
compromise between the guidelines following from the theory, the practice of international
trade and the data availability. The measurement problems following from this compromise
are further exacerbated by the lack of unanimity among various authors as to the
assignment of specific branches of industry into one of the two sectors (e.g. agriculture,
mining and quarrying, energy sector etc. are particularly problematic). Furthermore, in
view of the high share of services in the foreign trade flows of many countries, the common
assumption of nontradability of services is highly problematic as well. 
In general, problems related to the sectoral division fall into two closely interrelated
categories. In the first case, the proper assignment of some branches or sub-branches of
the economy to either sector is made impossible due to the lack of data at a sufficiently
disaggregated level. For instance, this is the case with the energy sector whose tradability
can easily be questioned, but in view of the problems with obtaining detailed data at the
section level, they are commonly included in the tradable sector (together with other
branches of industry). Furthermore, there are many services that are traded
internationally and are subject to foreign competition (e.g. air transportation services), but
due to the lack of data they are treated as nontradable, together with other purely
nontradable services (such as for example, haircutting).
The second category of problems arises at a conceptual level. Even if we are in a position
to obtain very precise data at a sufficiently disaggregated level, the problem with sector
division would not disappear. This is because tradability of goods and services is a highly
disputed characteristic and there is no agreed way to measure it.15 Although some authors
propose formalised algorithms for distinguishing between tradables and nontradables,16
these methods are not straightforward and are not universally accepted. Moreover, once
the division following such an algorithm has been made, frictions to arbitrage (mainly
transport costs and trade barriers) could make some goods and services nontradable for
some ranges of prices, but tradable otherwise. Consequently, even with an access to very
detailed and disaggregated datasets, problems with classifying problematic sections or
branches of the economy do not disappear.
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15 Problems with assigning agriculture to either sector is a good example.
16 For instance, De Gregorio et al. (1994) define tradables as those sectors for which the export share in total
production is larger than 10%. 
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While there is a clear distinction between these two problems, at a practical level, their
consequences are similar. Once the actual empirical division into two sectors has been
made, one can be sure that the part of the economy defined as nontradables will inevitably
contain an element of the tradable sector while the part of the economy defined as
tradables will contain an element of the nontradable sector. 
Figure 4 presents the graphical illustration of the sector division problem. In order to
focus the argument, let us assume that the actual tradable segment of the economy is A,
and consequently, that of the nontradable sector amounts to (1-A). Due to poor data
availability (insufficiently detailed disaggregation) as well as imperfect knowledge, the
empirical division implies a different break-up of the economy: the total tradable sector
makes up 100*a% of the economy, while the rest 100*(1-a)% is assigned to the nontradable
sector. It has to be mentioned that, in reality the value of A remains unknown. If we
mistakenly estimate the shares of respective sectors: A and (1-A) as a and (1-a) both
estimated shares are ‘contaminated’ and can be expressed as weighted averages of the
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ sector (see Figure 4). The true price levels in both sectors are PT
and PNT while the estimated price levels, pT and pNT are equal to:17
(17) pT= (1-m) PT + m PNT and        pNT = (1-n) PNT + n PT
where m and n are coefficients indicating the extent of ‘contamination’ of price level
measures in sector T and NT, respectively.
The indicator of interest from the point of view of our research is the index of relative
prices RP=PNT-PT and its estimated version:
(18) rp = pNT - pT
If we plug (17) into (18) and rearrange the terms we get: 
(19) rp = (PNT – PT)(1-m-n)= RP (1-m-n).
which means that the estimated relative prices are equal to true relative prices corrected
for ‘contamination’ of sectors by the factor (1-m-n).
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17 To simplify algebra and in line with the original formulation of the HBS theory, we assume that we deal
with two composite products and two related prices (i.e. PT and PNT are the only prices in the economy).
The same concerns productivity measures: we only single out two values of productivity.
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If our measure of productivity is likewise improperly measured, we encounter the same
problem. To allow for heterogeneity of measurement errors, we assume that the share of
‘nontradable productivity’ in a measure of productivity in the tradable sector (pro_T)
equals p, while the share of ‘tradable productivity’ improperly included in the measure of
productivity in the nontradable sector (pro_NT) is r.18 By analogy the true relative
productivity (RPRO) and the estimated relative productivity (rpro) are related through the
‘correction’ factor:
(20) rpro = RPRO (1-s-r)
If we estimate a simple univariate equation where relative productivities explain relative
prices by OLS (internal HBS, see equation (4)), then, following from the standard formula
for the coefficient β=(X’X)-1X’y (where X is the matrix/vector of explanatory variables and
y is the vector of a dependent variable) we obtain:
(21)
where β is the resultant coefficient while B stands for the coefficient that would be
obtained where both variables measured correctly over the two sectors and m, n, s, r are
numbers ranging from 0 to 1 that reflect the extent of ‘contamination’ in measures of
sectoral indicators. The bias disappears when the aggregate ‘contamination’ of both
indicators is identical, i.e., the sum of shares of improperly assigned sectors is identical for
both indicators. Unquestionably, the bias in the series also causes the actual estimates of
the standard error to deviate from the estimates that would be obtained if both sectors
were defined properly. Without calculating specific estimates of this bias,19 we can make
a claim that the resulting t-statistics of the regression will deviate from the values of these
statistics in the situation of precise sectoral definitions.
In the case of other techniques used in the empirical analysis in this paper, i.e. panel group
mean Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) and Pooled Group Mean Estimation (PMGE),20 the
correction factor is much more complicated. It remains, however, to be a function of the
extent of ‘contamination’ of sectoral indicators. 
Thus, this section points out that the impossibility to measure precisely the various
nm
rs
−−
−−Β=
1
1β
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18 The scale of 'contamination' of each indicator may be different due to various data sources and related
possibilities to extract sufficiently disaggregated data.  However, we assume that this scale is constant in
time. 
19 This estimate is much more complicated than the estimate of the coefficient bias.
20 For methodological details see Appendix II
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indicators over the tradable and nontradable sector might introduce a systematic bias in
these series and consequently in the resulting estimates of the HBS effects. Therefore, if
the empirical definition of the two sectors is problematic, there are reasons to expect
problems with the final estimates of elasticities of the HBS effect, such as the bias in the
coefficients and unreliable t-statistics.
5.1.2. Price series problems
Furthermore, additional problems may arise if price series cover goods and services whose
prices are administratively controlled by the state. As explained in section 2.3, the HBS
model assumes that the price level in the tradable sector is fixed by the PPP condition, while
the price level of nontradables is determined in the domestic market as a result of profit
maximisation by firms faced with the economy-wide wage rate w and sectoral productivity.
Thus, the HBS model assumes a price setting process that is essentially free-market and
follows from adjusting prices in response to wage and productivity changes.21
The reality of transition economies is quite different. Central and local governments
continue to maintain substantive control over many prices in the economy (Wozniak, 2002
and Egert et al., 2003). This is particularly the case for services many of which used to be
part of the social safety net during communist times with prices kept at extraordinarily
low levels (e.g. utilities, electricity, telecommunication, and transport). Although in the
course of the 1990s, prices of many services were liberalised, central and local
governments still regulate a substantive portion of the nontradable sector and a somewhat
smaller share of the tradable sector.22 In most transition economies (and not only) such
controls are exercised over large parts of the transportation sector (e.g. railways), rents,
postal and telecommunication, health-care and judiciary services. Various types of
agencies typically control growth of prices of electricity, gas and hot water (the bulk of the
E section of NACE). Furthermore, prices of fuel, alcohol and cigarettes are determined
largely by changes in excise taxes set by the government.23
As a result of this regulation, the price setting process is heavily distorted and departs from
that assumed in the HBS theory. In reality, it is the administrative decisions and not the labour
cost pressure that drive prices up in specific parts of the nontradable and tradable sector and
determine the timing and scale of these adjustments. As mentioned earlier, this problem is
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21 In the HBS theory the process is somewhat more complex as involves solving the system of four equations:
2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. 
22 For example, the weight of the administratively controlled goods and services in the CPI basket is about
25% in Poland (NBP materials) and 20% in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
23 Excise tax is one of the many factors determining prices of these products, however, in the case of some
of them (e.g. cigarettes and alcohol) it is, by far, the most important factor. 
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particularly pronounced in the case of services. Using the example of the Polish CPI, we can
notice a substantial disparity of inflation rates in free-market and regulated services (Wozniak,
2004). During the period 1991-2003 the average monthly growth of prices of unregulated
services was 1.6%, and it was 2.1% for administratively controlled services (1.4% for the CPI).
On a cumulated basis, this amounts to the annual inflation difference of 6 percentage points
on average during this period. The inflation disparity between the two types of services
declines as we approach the end of the sample,24 however, it still remains positive. 
Such a disparity is very common across the CEECs and the Polish example can be considered
representative for this process. There are many reasons for the persistence of the positive bias
of regulated service prices. In addition to the already mentioned initial undervaluation of
many services under the socialist safety net, we can point to a few other factors common for
most administratively controlled services. Most of them are generated in companies that are
still state-owned monopolies and have gone through a process of gradual restructuring
aiming at replacing the obsolete capital stock and achieving cost recovery (e.g. electricity
plants, water supply companies, railways).25 Their prices are regulated by various regulatory
agencies where price adjustment decisions are made taking into account various nonmarket
factors, such as national policies vis-à-vis specific industries (including but not limited to
privatisation and restructuring processes), concerns over social consequences of price
adjustments and purely political factors. In view of the fundamental difference of such a price
setting policy in comparison with the market price setting policy, including such ‘problematic’
sectors in the measure of services is bound to introduce bias in the sectoral price index.  
However, due to insufficient disaggregation of data, we are unable to single out and eliminate
these industries from the sectoral price indicators that consequently cover both the free market
and the administered portion of both sectors. In doing so, we cannot hope that the assumption
about the price setting behaviour in both sectors is met and consequently, we might encounter
problems with observing and estimating the effects posited by the HBS theory. 
5.2. Wage equalisation
In this section we closely look at the wage equalisation process between tradable and
nontradable sectors. The inter-sectoral equalisation of nominal wages is one of the two
fundamental assumptions of the HBS model (see chapter 2). Because wage equalisation is
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24 Partly due to falling overall inflation and partly due to the fact that the bulk of the relative price catch-up
has been attained already for the administratively controlled sectors. 
25 Additionally, many of these industries have had to comply with restrictive ecological regulations which
substantially raised their costs throughout the 1990s.
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a critical transmission channel between productivity differentials and nontradable prices,
the failure to find evidence of inter-sectoral wage equalisation can undermine the HBS
theory. Before we move to the visual inspection of the data for CEECs, however, the
possible implications of the lack of wage equalisation for the HBS analysis are discussed. 
5.2.1.Relative wage differential – consequences for the HBS model 
Below, we consider the model discussed in detail in chapter 2, but allow wages in the
tradable sector to differ from wages in the nontradable sector. Using equations (1) through
(3), we first derive the ‘modified Baumol-Bowen’ effect:
(22) ∆(PNT/PT) = ∆pNT - ∆pT = (δ/γ) ∆aT- ∆aNT + δ(∆wNT- ∆wT)
In equation (22) the price differential between sectors is not solely explained by the supply
side of the economy – i.e., productivity differentials – but also by the relative sectoral wage.
Thus, if we omitted the last term of equation (22) in our estimation, when in fact it was
significant, we would run into the omitted variable problem. In economic terms, this
means that the observed inflation differential between nontradable and tradable sectors
may be additionally explained by sectoral wage differences. In other words, the
differences between the observed price differential and the price differential implied by
the productivity developments may be a result of existing differences in sectoral wages. 
Equation (23) sets out the implication of the violation of perfect labour mobility in the
‘international’ version of the HBS effect (assuming that PPP holds):
(23) ∆pNT - ∆p*T= ∆eT+ (1 – α)[(δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT+ δ (∆wNT- ∆wT)] –
(1 – α*)[(δ*/γ*)∆a*T- ∆a*NT+ δ* (∆w*NT- ∆w*T)]
Similar to the ‘domestic’ version of the HBS effect, the lack of wage equalisation means
that the sectoral wage differences term at home and abroad does not vanish from the
equation. Equation (23) can be regarded as a ‘generalised form’ of the HBS effect in which
sectoral wages do not equalise. However, this has different implications under different
conditions:
1) If δ (∆wNT- ∆wT)>0 or δ (∆wNT- ∆wT)<0 and δ* (∆wNT- ∆wT)=0, then the inability of the
HBS effect to explain the observed trend in real appreciation or depreciation of real
exchange rates, may result from the existing wage differences between the two sectors
under consideration;
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2) If the wage differentials abroad and at home are equal in magnitude (and α=α* and
δ=δ*) then the differentials will cancel out, and the HBS effect may still fully explain
international price differentials. 
3) If the sectoral wage differentials at home and abroad are different (and α≠α* and δ≠δ*),
then this implies that there exist additional factors responsible for differences in
inflation between home and abroad.
The domestic HBS hypothesis which assumes wage equalisation suggests that productivity
shocks pass perfectly through to relative price changes. Nevertheless, the question
remains if, for the HBS to hold, it is enough to just test for stationarity in relative wages
(the implication of which is cointegrated relationship between wNT and wT) or the
condition should be stronger, i.e., sectoral wages do not only have to be cointegrated, but
also the cointegrating coefficient must be equal to 1. It can be shown that if the sectoral
wage differential is different than 1 but persistent (i.e., stationary), it is still possible for
the HBS effect to hold. This is because the total differentiation of wNT=wT+c (where c is
a positive constant) is equal to total differentiation of wNT=wT (see (3a) and (3b)).26 In this
case equations of interest are equivalent to previously derived equations (4) and (9) (see
chapter 2).
5.2.2. Data and Definitions
For the purpose of this study, we verify the wage equalisation assumption in nine CEECs
covered in our sample. The annual data on sectoral employment and average earnings per
worker27 is sourced from the LABORSTA ILO database (Table 2B and 5A, respectively)
and spans the period 1992-2003.28 Regrettably, data on the number of employees in each
sector are missing for three countries (Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania). Therefore, our
results for these countries may be biased, as the performance of wages on the aggregate
level (tradable or nontradable) may be dominated by the performance of wages in sections
where employment is higher. Also, the lack of quarterly data makes it impossible to
conduct any econometric analysis. 
We define equalisation of wages between the tradable and nontradable sectors in five
alternative ways. The first two definitions are in line with definitions 1 and 2 discussed in
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26 This is also true for wT=wNT+c, but in the case of CEECs, the nontradable wages seem to be higher than
tradable wages.
27 Earnings should include: direct wages and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and
gratuities and housing and family allowances paid by the employer. 
28 Due to data availability, the span of the data varies between countries (see presented Figures). 
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Section 4.1. Given the classification problems in the tradable and nontradable sector
discussed in Section 5.1, the remaining three definitions are used as sensitivity checks. In all
of them tradables are classified as manufacturing only (i.e., section D); nontradables consists
of the part of the economy comprising sections from F to O, which was further divided into
market (i.e., sections F to K) and nonmarket nontradables (i.e., sections L to O).
Consequently, we look at the wage equalisation process between the following sections of
the economy:
1. (ALL excluding C-E)/(C-E)
2. (F-O)/(A-E)
3. (F-O)/D
4. (F-K)/D
5. (L-O)/D.
5.2.3. Empirical results
The graphical analysis shows (Figure 5) that in majority of cases the results do not point to
wage equalisation assumed in the HBS theory. There is a tendency for wages in services to be
higher than in manufacturing in all countries. This remains true even when we classify
agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying as well as gas, water and electricity sectors as
tradable (except for Bulgaria and partly Poland). Tradable wages are only higher than
nontradable wages when we include agriculture and fishing in the sheltered sector. On
average, the HBS condition concerning wage equalisation between open and sheltered sectors
is not met. We now turn to the particular country cases where we focus on relative wages as
defined by the first two definitions given above and compare them with the rest of the results. 
In Bulgaria,29 since 1997 the ratio of nontradable to tradable wages is on a stable,
increasing path, regardless of the definition used. Nevertheless, the pace at which
nontradable wages have been catching up differs and depends on the definition used. For
the (F-O)/(A-E) definition, wages only equalise in 2002. When we include agriculture in
nontradables, however, the ratio is still below one. On the other hand, when the tradable
sector is only represented by manufacturing, wages equalise already in 1999. Since then,
nontradable wages exceed tradable wages. The differences between market and
nonmarket nontradable wages vanish. It is difficult to predict a further course for wage
developments, but at present, the trend appears to point toward an increase in
nontradable wages. Relative wages in Bulgaria neither equalise nor seem to be stationary.
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29 As already pointed data for Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania is not weighed by the sectoral employment. This
can result in the upward or downward bias of the results.
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In the Czech Republic, the relative wage of nontradables in terms of tradables has
remained above 1 during the entire period under investigation. Unlike in Bulgaria, there
is a divergence in relative nonmarket and market nontradable wages after 1996. The
overall picture for the Czech Republic reveals stability in relative wages for all the
definitions but (F-K)/D and (L-O)/D. The former seems to be trending upwards after 1996;
the latter exhibits larger fluctuations comparing with other relationships considered. 
In Estonia, between 1994 and 1999, the relative nontradable wage for the open sector has
been increasing albeit moderately. After a drop in 2000, tradable wages again picked up.
Since 1994 the difference between relative wages in the (F-O)/(A-E) and (F-K)/D sectors
has been almost negligible, i.e., both definitions could be used interchangeably. When we
include agriculture in the nontradable sector, wages in the sheltered sector are lower than
wages in the more productive, tradable, sector until 1999, then the relationship shifts in
favour of nontradables. 
In the Hungarian case, the relative wages seem to be quite volatile. Wages in the (F-O) and
(A-E) sectors can be considered equalised between 1995 and 2001. However, from 2001
onwards, the sectoral wage gap increases for all tested definitions. When agriculture is
classified as part of the nontradable sector, the wage ratio between sheltered and open
sectors is below 1 until 2001. Interestingly, in Hungary the pattern of relative nontradable
earnings per worker defined as (F-O) and (A-E) almost mirrors the pattern that arises
using the definition of (F-O)/D. This is because high wages in sectors C and E are almost
entirely offset by low wages in agriculture. 
In Latvia, from 1998 ratios (F-O)/(A-E), (F-K)/D and (F-O)/D have all been above 1 and
steadily increasing (except for the second definition when the relative wage declines after
2001). The ratio of nonmarket nontradable wages to wages in manufacturing exhibits the
same increasing trend, but reaches 1 only in 2000. When nontradables are classified as F-
O plus agriculture and fishing (sections A and B, respectively) and tradables consist of
manufacturing, mining and quarrying as well as gas, water and electricity (lines C to E),
the wage ratio between the two is, on average, only 6% below 1 and does not display any
significant increase. 
In Lithuania, before 1998 wages in market services were 33% higher than in
manufacturing; when nonmarket services are included, manufacturing wages were 21%
lower. Similar to previous findings, broadening the definition of tradable goods lowers the
wage gap between the sectors; again, including agriculture in the numerator results in a
higher tradable wage (on average almost 20%). After 1998, fluctuations in relative
nontradable wages in Lithuania seem to be negligible. 
In Poland, relative nominal wages trend upwards and remain on average 4% above unity
for all three different definitions of services expressed in terms of manufacturing. In 2002,
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this tendency was reversed. In Poland, the difference between market and nonmarket
nontradable wages is the smallest of the whole sample examined. Relative wages defined
both as (ALL excluding C-E)/(C-E) and (F-O)/(A-E) also trend upwards. However, Poland
is the only country in which both of these ratios almost constantly remain below 1 which
is explained by significantly higher wages in mining and quarrying compared with wages
in manufacturing.30
Market nontradable wages in Romania, when compared with wages in manufacturing, are
among the highest in the sample (on average by 9%). Since 1998 the ratio has been close
to 1, but has continued to move upwards. The scenario is repeated for the remaining
definitions. Unlike in Poland, the ratio between (F-O) and (A-E) is higher than between (F-
K) and D. The large discrepancy between (F-O)/(A-E) and (F-O)/D is a consequence of the
fact that manufacturing wages constitute only 55% of wages in sectors C and E. 
In Slovakia, manufacturing wages exhibit the smallest underperformance. Manufacturing
wages are on average 0.5% lower than in the total nontradable sector and tend towards
equalisation. This is due to low wages in the public sector services, which are on average
7% lower than wages in manufacturing. Looking at the behaviour of relative nontradable
wages in accordance with the (ALL excluding C-E)/(C-E) definition, we record higher
wages in the tradable sectors. As in Bulgaria and Poland, wages in mining and quarrying,
as well as in gas, water and electricity, are significantly higher than in manufacturing. In
general, relative wages in Slovakia have been on the fall since 1997.
Finally, in Slovenia, unlike in any other country in our sample, relative nontradable wages
are above 1 for all five definitions used. Wages in the total service sector are, on average,
30% higher than wages in manufacturing. This is the highest divergence in our sample. An
interesting feature of the performance of the wage gap in Slovenia is that wages in public
sector services are 45% of those in manufacturing. Additionally, although still above 1 –
the HBS assumed value – relative wages, except for private sector services in terms of
manufacturing, since 1998 seem to be stable. 
5.2.4. Concluding Remarks
The visual inspection suggests that the HBS assumption about cross-sectoral wage
homogeneity may be violated. There is a tendency for wages in services to be higher than in
manufacturing in all countries (i.e., δ(∆wNT- ∆wT)>0). Such a result is rather
counterintuitive and it is in stark contrast to results obtained for developed countries, where
wages in tradables tend to be higher than wages in nontradables (see for example
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30 On average, during the period under investigation, wages in manufacturing were only 52% of those in
mining.
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Søndergaard, 2003).31 Given that productivity in manufacturing is higher, this may reflect
strong unions in the nontradable sector, the presence of monopolistic competition or high
wages in the financial sector and suggest that relative wages could have an impact on real
exchange rate appreciation. However, in countries like the Czech Republic, Lithuania,
Poland or Slovenia, even though relative wages are not equal one, the difference between
tradable and nontradble wages looks relatively stable (at least for some definitions used).
This suggests, in line with the theoretical exposition presented in section 4.3.2, that the
mechanism which leads to the HBS effect in those countries may be present. Still, these
results should be treated with caution, since, due to the lack of data, we are unable to
perform any more advanced econometric analysis. Furthermore, ongoing structural changes
in CEECs (i.e., price liberalisation) may also contribute to fluctuations in relative wages. 
At this point it is worth mentioning that other studies which look at the wage equalisation
in CEECs differ in their conclusions. For example, Egert (2002), who analyses relative
wage developments in five CEECs between 1991 and 1999, assumes wage equalisation.
Wage equalisation was also assumed implicitly in Egert et al. (2002). This is surprising
given that the graphical analysis presented in both papers does not appear to suggest this.
On the other hand, Mihajlek and Klau (2003) assume uniform wage growth in some, but
not all countries (in countries where wage homogeneity was ruled out, nontradable wage
growth was higher than tradable wage growth). Nonetheless, it might very well be that
different conclusions concerning sectoral wage equalisation in various studies conducted
for CEECs, may stem from different sectoral definitions and time periods considered and
only reflect measurement difficulties.
From the theoretical point of view, the violation of the wage homogeneity assumption implies
that the HBS effect is not able to fully explain the observed sectoral and cross-country price
differentials (i.e., domestic and international version of the model) and that the relative wage
gap may also play a role in explaining changes in real exchange rates. However, as shown in
Section 5.2.1, persistent differences between tradable and nontradable wages do not prevent
the HBS effect from coming into play. This proposition should be further tested empirically
using, for example, panel unit root tests and cointegration techniques.  
5.3. Purchasing Power Parity
The PPP enters the HBS theory in the equations leading to the final determination of the
real exchange rate (equations 5-9 in chapter 2). The PPP model is based on the law of one
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31 In CEECs, tradable wages are only higher than nontradable wages when we include agriculture and
fishing in the sheltered sector.
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price which is extended to a basket of tradable goods. According to the absolute PPP
paradigm, a nominal exchange rate of any two currencies should reflect closely the
relative purchasing powers of the two monetary units represented by national price levels.
The strong version of PPP requires that the nominal exchange rate is exactly equal to the
ratio of price levels of tradables in the two countries. Consequently, the real exchange rate
deflated with prices of tradables must be stationary and equal to one. The weak version of
PPP does not require the unit elasticity and entails only that the real exchange rate reverts
to some constant mean (Pedroni, 2001). 
In this section we will verify the assumption of the PPP in CEECs by means of various
econometric tests. As mentioned before, this assumption is a key element of the
international version of the HBS model (or the external transmission mechanism) and
empirical evidence against it may severely impair the empirical results of the HBS
estimations.
5.3.1. Stylized facts on PPP in CEECs
Prior to formal empirical testing of the relative PPP hypothesis32 in CEECs, we analyse
main trends in nominal and real exchange rates deflated with prices of tradables and
nontradables over the period 1993-2003. Because the PPP model should work in principle
only for goods that could be traded internationally, the real exchange rate will be deflated
with producer prices in manufacturing (RER3).33 This measure is believed to be the best
readily available proxy for prices of tradables.34
In Bulgaria, apart from two periods of real depreciation of the lev against the euro (in
1994 and from 1996 to 1997), a clear appreciation trend was observed. After the financial
crisis in 1997 and fixing the lev to the German mark (in 1999 to the euro), the appreciation
of the real exchange rate stemmed primarily from higher inflation of Bulgarian tradables
prices as compared to the euro area.
In the Czech Republic, there was also an appreciation trend in the real exchange rate of
the koruna against the euro with the few exceptions in 1997 and 2002. Between 1993 and
1997 changes in the nominal exchange rate against the euro were small; the positive
tradable inflation differential between the Czech Republic and the euro area was the main
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32 Relative PPP refers to price indices as opposed to absolute PPP, where the condition is defined in terms of
price levels.
33 In case of Bulgaria, due to lack of data, the PPI for total industry was used. In all analysed countries,
however, these two price indices (the PPI for the industry and for manufacturing only) were very similar. 
34 However, due to the impossibility to obtain measures of value added for such a narrow aggregate
(equivalent of the section D) this formulation of the real exchange rate is not used for subsequent
empirical analysis of the HBS effect. Alternative definitions of the real exchange rate (RER1 and RER2)
are presented in Figure 3.
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cause of the real appreciation. After the financial crisis in 1997, the observed trends
reversed: the nominal exchange rate of the koruna against the euro was appreciating and
the inflation differential approached zero and even turned negative in 2003. 
In Estonia due to early fixing of the kroon to the German mark (in 1999 to the euro),
developments in real exchange rate were largely dominated by changes in inflation.
However, before 1999 some changes in the kroon exchange rate against the synthetic euro
played a role as well. Until 1999, prices of tradables in Estonia tended to grow faster than
in the euro area, though the difference was gradually declining. Afterwards, no clear trend
in tradables inflation differential was evident. As a result of these developments the real
exchange rate stabilised somewhat starting from around 1997-1998.
In Hungary, the real euro exchange rate for tradables followed a clear appreciation trend with
the two short periods of relative stabilisation in 1996/1997 and 2001/2002. The real
appreciation was mainly attributable to positive inflation in tradables (until 2001) as nominal
exchange rate of the euro exhibited a sustained depreciation trend with some reversal in 2002.
As in the case of Estonia the difference in inflation rates for tradables was on the fall. 
In Latvia, the trend appreciation lasted until around 1999. To some extent this stemmed
from higher inflation of tradables in comparison to the euro area (only up to around
1997/1998) and to nominal appreciation of the Latvian lat against the euro in 1993, 1997-
1998 and 1999/2000. Afterwards, changes in the real exchange rate as well as in inflation
differential were two-sided. 
In Lithuania, the real exchange of the litas against the euro continued to appreciate until
2000 and only then stabilised due to changing the pegging currency from the dollar to the
euro (in February 2002) and equalisation of growth rates in tradables inflation with the
euro area. The real exchange rate appreciation until 1998 was a result of higher inflation
in Lithuania than in the euro area, but afterwards appreciation was mainly driven by
nominal appreciation. At the turn of 1999/2000 there was a period of increases in PPI
which could be attributed to increases in oil prices as oil production and products thereof
constitute a significant part of manufacturing output (and consequently these prices have
had substantial weight in the PPI basket). 
In Poland until the end of 1999, the real exchange rate did not exhibit any trend and was
mean reverting. The nominal depreciation of the zloty against the euro was accompanied
by a constant – though declining – positive inflation differential in tradables inflation vs.
the euro area. After 1999 the inflation differential approached zero, but nominal exchange
rate started to drive the appreciation (1999-2001) and later the depreciation (2002-2003)
of the real exchange rate. 
In Slovakia, the nominal exchange rate against the euro was largely mean reverting over
the period 1993-2001 with a depreciation of the mean in 1999. At the same time inflation
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deferential was positive and fairly constant from 1996 to the end of 2001 and approached
zero afterwards. Consequently, there was a constant real appreciation in the exchange rate
with a break in 1999. 
In Slovenia the real exchange rate of the euro was fluctuating around a constant mean
though with long periods of diverting from the mean and with large peaks and troughs.
This was accompanied by fairly constant inflation differential for tradables prices and a
constant depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which was a deliberate exchange rate
policy of Slovenian authorities. 
To sum up, for most observations between 1993 and 2003 there was a clear appreciation
trend in real exchange rates of domestic currencies against the euro deflated with prices
of tradables in CEECs. Poland and Slovenia were the main exceptions. This stemmed (at
least in the initial phase) from higher domestic tradables inflation than in the euro area as
nominal currencies were fixed or depreciated at a slower rate. As in most CEECs the
convergence of inflation rates for tradables was evident in recent years, in few cases the
real appreciation was explained by the appreciation of nominal exchange rates – mostly
evident in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. In addition, a close unconditional
correlation between CEECs’ and euro-area’s tradables inflation was observed. 
Although the real appreciation was mainly driven by inflation differential (at least in the
initial period), the pattern of changes in the real exchange rate was dominated by volatility
of nominal exchange rates – mostly evident for countries with more flexible exchange rate
regimes (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), but also for Lithuania and Latvia that
have been pursuing fixed exchange rate policies.35 Thus, the close correlation of nominal
and real exchange rates observed in developed economies is also evident in CEECs.36
The above observations of a clear appreciation trend of real exchange rates against the
euro deflated with tradables prices in CEECs may seem to be at odds with the relative PPP
hypothesis.37 Formal test of the PPP model are discussed below. 
5.3.2. Econometric tests of PPP in CEECs
The empirical literature on PPP testing is vast and generally two approaches are
distinguished. The first deals with testing stationarity of the real exchange rate, i.e. testing
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35 For these two countries domestic currencies were not pegged to the euro - in Lithuania the litas became
pegged to the euro only in February 2002 and before it was pegged to the US dollar; and in Latvia the lat
has been pegged to SDR.
36 Demonstrated among others by Engel (1999).
37 The recent consensus on the PPP theory suggests that this is a very long phenomenon and the speed of
convergence is very slow (for developed countries between three and five years - Rogoff, 1996). Thus, it
could be claimed that the analysed period is too short to uncover the long-term PPP behaviour or that the
observed appreciation trend is in fact a transition towards the PPP equilibrium. 
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whether the real exchange rate reverts to a constant mean. This property is usually
analysed using time series or panel unit root tests which do, however, raise a considerable
controversy (see Maddala and Kim, 1998). Recently, panel unit root tests attracted a lot of
attention and they have been extensively used in PPP testing. The unit-root approach to
PPP testing was applied among others by Parsley and Wei (1995), Frankel and Rose
(1996), MacDonald (1996), Bayoumi and MacDonald (1998), and Chortareas and Driver
(2001). These tests are appropriate for testing only the weak version of the PPP hypothesis.
The visual inspection indicating clear trends in the real euro exchange rates for CEECs
(Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2) and formal stationarity tests performed in section 4.3, lead us
to reject the hypothesis of nonstationarity.38 In this section we also pursue the second
method of testing for PPP, i.e. a direct estimation of the coefficients in the following
equation:
(24) e = α1P
T – α2P
T*
If the coefficients (α1 and α2) in equation (24) – the definition of the nominal exchange rate
(e) – are equal to [1,-1], then the real exchange rate (deflated with prices of tradables) will
be constant and equal to one. This is the so called strong version of relative PPP. 
In practice, equation (24) can be also estimated with a homogeneity restriction (i.e.,
restricting the coefficients on prices to be the same). The former approach seems to be
more universal as it allows for explicit testing of the homogeneity restriction39 and could
shed more light on the divergence from the PPP model, if such a divergence is present.
This approach was applied among others by Moon and Perron (2002). They stressed that
in this model the PPP hypothesis is the null hypothesis unlike in most unit-root approaches
to PPP testing, where if the null hypothesis of real exchange rate nonstationarity (i.e. the
evidence against the PPP model) cannot be rejected, then it is unclear whether that is
because PPP does not hold or because the selected test has low power. On the other hand,
testing of the restricted PPP model was pursued, among others, by Pedroni (2001) and
Taylor (1996). 
In addition to homogeneity restriction, the specification of equation (24) can be further
complicated by the choice of dependent variable. It is often the case, that the PPP
framework is interpreted as a model of exchange rate determination – as might be inferred
from the formulation of equation (24). However, in general the PPP framework explains
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38 Although the tests in section 4.3 were performed for PPI and not PPIM, the two measures are very close
to one another and hence we can assume the same result of unit root tests for PPIM. 
39 More precisely, the symmetry and proportionality condition. 
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international arbitrage only and thus the PPP model could be interpreted also as a model
of domestic or foreign price determination (only for tradables). This distinction has
important consequences for empirical testing of PPP as it relates to the issue of exogeneity
of variables. The very simple theoretical framework of the PPP model does not indicate
which variable should be dependent. For time-series estimations, this issue could be
addressed in the VAR framework where exogeneity of variables could be tested formally.
However, in the case of panel models this cannot be easily done. Therefore, other
information on the tested variables should be used in order to determine the most
appropriate specification of the PPP model.
The nominal exchange rate for some CEECs was a predetermined or controlled variable –
due to the adoption of the de facto fixed or crawling peg exchange rate regimes.40 On the one
hand, under the fixed exchange rate regime, it does not make sense to use the nominal
exchange rate as a dependent variable in time series estimations as it is simply a constant.
On the other hand, under more flexible exchange rate regimes, nominal exchange rates tend
to be very volatile and difficult to predict. Given both arguments, the nominal exchange rate
is not a good candidate for a dependent variable in the PPP model for CEECs.41 The same
should apply to foreign prices of tradables. CEECs are small economies and do not have
enough market power to influence foreign prices (in this particular application proxied by
the euro area prices). Given these considerations and the potential problem of exogeneity,
the following specification of equation ) seems the most appropriate in the case of CEECs: 
(24a) PT = β1e + β2PT*
Estimations of PPP models are conducted for the unbalanced panel of nine CEECs
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic,
and Slovenia) covering generally the period 1993-2002. Prices are proxied by producer
prices in levels in manufacturing.42 To check robustness of results, PPP models are
estimated by two methods developed for heterogeneous dynamic panels: Panel Group
Mean FMOLS due to Pedroni (2001) and PMGE due to Pesaran et al. (1999). Both
methods are later used for the analysis of the HBS effect.43 The methodology of FMOLS
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40 Changes in exchange rate regimes were quite frequent in some CEECs. See Rawdanowicz (2003) for a
brief description of exchange rate regimes in this region.
41 Such an approach is justified only if one is convinced that the volatility of nominal exchange rate is not
driven by volatility of prices (home or abroad).
42 PPP models were also estimated for the PPI for the entire industry (i.e. including mining as well as gas,
water, and electricity supply sectors) to proxy the sector division used subsequently to verify the HBS
effect. They render similar results and will not be reported here. In the case of Bulgaria, due to lack of
the PPI for manufacturing, prices for total industry were used
43 Also results for the Mean Group Estimator (MGE) are provided in tables as reference values, but are not
discussed in the text.
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and PMGE is concisely reviewed in Appendix II.  In order to secure sufficient number of
degrees of freedom only the restricted version of the model (24a) is estimated. The
estimates obtained by applying these two methods should be interpreted as long-run
coefficients (i.e., a cointegration vector). Therefore, they are appropriate for inferring
about the strong version of the PPP hypothesis (i.e., slope coefficients equal to 1 or -1) as
coefficient restrictions could be tested formally.  
The estimated coefficient of model (24a) turned out to be below 1 for both methods of
estimation, but in the case of the FMOLS estimator the coefficient was not statistically
different from 1 (see Table 5). Thus, the PMGE estimation does not support the PPP
hypothesis and indicates a depreciation bias, while the FMOLS estimation confirms the PPP
hypothesis. Both of these findings are at odds with the stylized facts presented in section
5.3.1. A closer look into the country specific results provides some explanation of this
outcome. Under the FMOLS method, the estimated coefficient for Lithuania was negative
and significant (for Latvia only negative). This could be hardly reconciled with the nominal
exchange rate model. In the case of Lithuania, this peculiar result could be attributable to
the increases in producer prices in manufacturing due to soaring oil prices in 1998-1999.44
A further analysis of country-specific cases shows that the coefficient for Slovenia is below
one, though it is not statistically different from one. In this case we have the confirmation of
the PPP model. This could stem from the deliberate exchange rate policy of permanent
nominal devaluation of the Slovenian tolar. For other countries, however, the estimated
coefficients turned out significantly higher than one, indicating the appreciation bias.45
FMOLS panel coefficients are mean averages of country-specific results and thus are
sensitive to outlier estimates (similarly to the mean group estimator discussed in Pesaran et
al. (1999)). In order to check the scope of the bias due to the specific outcome for Lithuania,
the model (24a) was re-estimated excluding this country. Dropping Lithuania from the
sample proved to have a downward bias on the panel estimates in the case of FMOLS
estimations, but changed the estimates marginally under the PMGE estimations (compare
Table 5 and Table 6). Summarising, both methods of estimations reject the strong version of
PPP, but only FMOLS estimates confirmed the appreciation bias. 
Rawdanowicz (2004) checks the sensitivity of the coefficients to the selection of the
dependent variable in the PPP model by introducing two remaining specifications (with
the nominal exchange rate and foreign prices as dependent variables), but the results
remain the same. Among alternative explanations of the PPP puzzle suggested and
discussed by the author the following issues are addressed:
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44 The differences in the goods baskets among countries used for calculations of PPI indices (in this case due
to higher share of oil products in Lithuania) could be the reason for this peculiar outcome and in general
for the observed deviation from PPP.
45 Though for Poland, like for Slovenia, it was not statistically different from one. Thus, the estimates for
Slovenia and Poland are consistent with the observed trends in exchange rates and prices (see Table 5).
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• Problems with precise sector division (analogous to the problems described in
section 5.1)
• Incomplete substitutability of tradables in Western Europe and CEECs (or the
ensuing slack in the arbitrage mechanism)
• The existence of the nontradables processing component introducing frictions to
the international arbitrage.
5.3.3. Deviations from PPP - Consequences for the PPP model
Regardless of its sources, both visual inspection of graphs and empirical analysis provide
evidence for serious departures from PPP, or rather, indicate the impossibility to prove
PPP when related measures of prices are conventionally defined as producer prices in
manufacturing industries. Regardless of the many possible explanations of the PPP puzzle,
the fact that we cannot hope for the law of one price to hold (equation (8)), means that the
first three terms in equation (7) do not vanish and the international version of the HBS
model (equation (9b)) takes the form:
(9c) ∆p - ∆p*= ∆pT - ∆pT + (1 – α)[(δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT] – (1 – α*)[(δ*/γ*)∆aT*- ∆aNT*]  
If we fail to account for the fact that the PPP does not hold, and we estimate the external
HBS by means of the standard formulation of the model of the type of equation (9b), our
estimations are subject to the typical omitted variable problem with all the detrimental
consequences for the reliability of the regression coefficients.46
It has to be mentioned, that unlike in the case of sector division and wage equalisation
assumptions, the inability to empirically confirm PPP, does not impact on the entire HBS
reasoning, but only on its international version (i.e. the external transmission mechanism).
Thus, the estimates of the internal HBS should not be distorted by the problems with the
PPP revealed in our analysis.
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46 When PPP does not hold and the equation with real exchange rate on the LHS and relative productivity
differentials on the RHS is estimated, we fail to account for an additional term on the RHS that follows
from the model derivation : ∆q = (∆e + ∆pT* - ∆pT )-{ (1 - α)[(δ/γ)∆aT- ∆aNT] - (1 - α*)[(δ*/γ*)∆aT*- ∆aNT*]}   
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6.1. Models and Cointegration Tests
In our paper we consider numerous versions of the domestic and international version of
the HBS model. In line with equation (4), the domestic HBS (Baumol-Bowen effect) is
tested through an estimation of the following three alternative equations:
(25a) bb_01: RP1 = f(PRO_T1 – PRO_NT2) = f(PRO1)
(25b) bb_02: RP2 = f(PRO_T2 – PRO_NT2) = f(PRO2)
(25c) bb_03: RP3 = f(PRO_T1 – PRO_NT2) = f(PRO1)
They all embody the basic relationship of the internal HBS effect, i.e. the causal
relationship between relative productivity and relative prices, but differ with respect to the
definitions of the variables used in estimations (see section 4.1). Alternative definitions of
productivity and price indicators should enable checking the robustness of results.
Likewise, we investigate alternative formulations of the external HBS, following the
equation (9b):
(26a) hbs_01: RER1 = f(PRO_T1 – PRO_NT2) = f(RPRO1)
(26b) hbs_02: RER1 = f(PRO_T2 – PRO_NT2) = f(RPRO2)
(26c) hbs_03: RER2 = f(PRO_T1 – PRO_NT2) = f(RPRO1)
(26d) hbs_04: RER2 = f(PRO_T2 – PRO_NT2) = f(RPRO2)
We check for cointegration by means of panel cointegration tests developed by Pedroni
(1997). These tests involve checking for unit roots in residuals obtained from postulated
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long-run relationships. The seven alternative versions of this test (Table 7) vary with
respect to the functional form of the test statistics and with respect to the pooling method:
first four tests are based on pooling the observations across the time dimension, while the
latter three are based on pooling the observations across the group dimension. Additional
methodological details can be found in Appendix II.
Table 7 presents results of the Pedroni tests carried out with specifications with and
without a linear trend for all seven relationships indicated above. Cointegrated
relationships are marked with one, two or three stars indicating rejection of a null
hypothesis of nonstationarity at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. In the case of
specifications without a trend (first seven columns), the tests point to the existence of
cointegrating relationships postulated by bb_01, bb_02. These tests do not, however, reject
the hypothesis of no cointegration for the remaining five models (bb_03, hbs_01, hbs_02,
hbs_03 and hbs_04). Including a trend changes the results somewhat. While most tests still
indicate cointegration for bb_01 and bb_02, one test finds cointegration also for bb_03 and
hbs_03, four tests confirm it for hbs_01 and hbs_04 while six tests point to cointegration
in hbs_03. 
The results reveal that the models of the internal HBS effect are generally cointegrated,
with the possible exception of bb_03, which involves the use of the relative price measure
defined as a ratio of the CPI in services to the PPI (unlike in bb_01 and bb_02 where ratios
of respective sectoral deflators are used). In contrast to the internal HBS, the evidence for
cointegration of the external HBS models is weak and confirmed only by selected tests for
the specification involving the trend. Thus, we can conclude that the relationship
postulated by the internal HBS effect seems to be cointegrated in our panel, while that
described by the external HBS effect comes out highly problematic. In the latter case the
acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration depends heavily on the
inclusion of the trend.  With these preliminary findings in mind, we now turn to the core
part of our empirical analysis where we test elasticities of the HBS model for the panel of
CEECs.
6.2. Estimations of the HBS equations
The empirical verification of the HBS hypotheses was conduced for an unbalanced panel
of nine CEECs in period 1995-2003. Estimations were performed separately for each of
the seven formulations of the HBS model: three alternative formulations of the internal
HBS effect (equations 25– a, b and c) and four alternative formulations of the external
HBS effect (equations (26– a, b, c and d).  All models are estimated by the two methods
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for heterogeneous dynamic panels: group mean FMOLS and PMGE previously used to test
the PPP. The estimates of these two methods should be interpreted as long-run coefficients,
thus, we expect the empirical results (statistical properties of the coefficients, model
fitness, etc.) to be in line with the findings following from the cointegration analysis
presented in the preceding section. Both methods are reviewed in Appendix II. 
Tables 8-10 present results of FMOLS and PMGE47 estimations for the internal HBS
models where a relative prices indicator is the dependent variable and the relative
productivity - the explanatory variable together with the Error Corrections Mechanism
(ECM) terms for PMGE. Tables 11-14 present analogous results for the external HBS
models where a real exchange rate is a dependent variable and explanatory variables are
relative productivity differentials. Tables 8-14 contain the FMOLS country-specific
estimates of the long-run elasticities and in the last row of the tables, the group-means
FMOLS estimate, equal to a simple average of country-specific estimates. Unlike FMOLS,
the PMGE estimation restricts the long-run coefficients to be equal for all countries, but
allows for individual country-specific coefficients of short-run elasticities (not reported in
the tables) and the ECM term. Thus, for the PMGE, the tables report the long-run estimate
of the elasticity (equal for all countries and for the panel) as well as ECM terms estimated
for individual countries.
In line with cointegration results, FMOLS and PMGE estimations point to a well behaved
and statistically significant internal transmission mechanism. In all three models, panel
long-run coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Elasticities of those
coefficients range from 0.35 to 0.53 for the first model, 0.55 to 0.56 for the second model
and 0.94 to 2.53 for the third model. The error correction term, which indicates the
presence of the error correction mechanism (i.e. the tendency to return to the long-run
relationship after short-run distortions) is significant and correctly (i.e. negatively) signed
in all models except for bb_03. The latter result implies that there might be some problems
with existence of the relationship in bb_03. This is further confirmed by regression
diagnostics tests (not presented in the table). Thus, the PMGE estimate of long-run
elasticity of 2.53 (very high both in comparison to the FMOLS estimate of the same model
and estimates of the other two models by both methods) is of small reliability and has to
be treated with caution. 
Even though the most important information on the long-run relationship is contained in
group-mean (panel) elasticities, looking at individual country estimates might shed some
light on country-specific factors. Examining country-specific estimates is also motivated
by their subsequent use in quantifying the HBS effect carried out in the next section.
Country-specific FMOLS results are strongly heterogeneous. Elasticities are significant
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and correctly signed for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland (in all models)
as well as Hungary and Slovenia (bb_03) and their magnitudes range from 0.54 to 2.11.48
For all countries in the sample, PMGE estimates of bb_01 and bb_02 indicate significant
and negative ECM terms. In line with previous findings, the PMGE estimation of bb_03
reveals serious stability problems with the panel and that most country-specific ECM
terms are insignificant and/or of an incorrect sign.
The results of estimations of the external HBS models are highly inconclusive (see tables
11-14). The FMOLS procedure yields significant and correctly signed group-mean
coefficients in three models (all except hbs_01), while the PMGE procedure - in two
models (in hbs_03 and hbs_04). The significant and correctly signed long-run coefficients’
estimates for both methods range from -0.4 to -1.3. 
The first two models (hbs_01 and hbs_02), based on the real exchange rate deflated with
the GVA deflator, are particularly problematic due to the insignificance of the PMGE (both
models) and FMOLS (hbs_01) panel elasticities and problems with diagnostic tests. Even
though for hbs_02 the FMOLS mean-group coefficient is significant and correctly signed,
only two out of seven country-specific estimates have this characteristic. Models using the
CPI-based real exchange rate (hbs_03 and hbs_04) are more robust, albeit hbs_03 exhibits
some diagnostic problems. PMGE yields a correctly signed and significant ECM for all
four models at the panel level, but reveals a few insignificant country-specific ECM terms
(especially for hbs_03 and hbs_04). 
Country-specific FMOLS elasticities with significant and correctly signed coefficients are
rather scarce and found mostly for Lithuania, Romania, Hungary and Slovenia.
Summing up, the FMOLS and PMGE results are broadly in line with findings from the
cointegration analysis. It seems that there is more evidence in favour of the internal than
external HBS effect. In the case of the internal HBS effect, cointegration tests established
robust cointegration relationships for models bb_01 and bb_02 for which both panel
estimation techniques produced significant and correctly signed panel long-run
coefficients and ECM terms (PMGE). In the case of bb_03 there were significant problems
with finding cointegration (only one out of 14 tests rejected the hypothesis of no
cointegration),49 which was later confirmed by problems with the stability of the model
estimated by PMGE (positive and insignificant error correction term).50
The cointegration tests applied to the external HBS models found cointegration only when
linear trend was included. The cointegrating relationship was partially confirmed for
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49 There are seven tests with trend and seven without a trend (see Table 7).
50 However, for bb_03 both methods produced significant and correctly signed long-run elasticity
coefficients.
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hbs_03 (six out of seven tests), hbs_01 (five out of seven tests) and hbs_04 (four out of seven
tests), while it was confirmed only in one test for hbs_02. Consequently, the results of the
panel estimation of the external HBS models are very heterogeneous: only hbs_03 and
hbs_04 yielded significant and correctly signed long-run coefficients and error correction
terms for both methods, while the estimations of hbs_01 and hbs_02 rendered highly
ambiguous results.   
Such outcomes can be interpreted in light of the findings in chapter 4, where we
investigated key assumptions of the HBS model. In particular, our findings related to wage
equalisation questioning the robustness or the very existence of this process in many
countries, seem not to hinder the relationship between relative productivity and relative
prices. This relationship came out statistically significant and fairly robust.  It may point
to the fact that even though it is hard to find clear empirical evidence in favour of sectoral
wage equalisation (see section 5.2), wage equalisation holds in real life and a failure to
detect it empirically comes from using unreliable data and imprecise sector definitions.
Alternatively, it might be the case – as presented in section 5.2.1– that the stable ratio of
sectoral wages found for many countries, is enough for the internal HBS effect to hold. 
On the other hand, the external transmission mechanism turned out problematic. This can
be reconciled with the apparent violation of the PPP as evidenced in section 5.3. The
assumption of the PPP in the tradable sector is the only assumption that is added to the
internal HBS in the process of obtaining the external HBS equation. Therefore, in light of
evidence supporting the internal HBS, the failure to empirically detect the external HBS
can well be explained by the lack of empirical evidence of PPP. Therefore, the ambiguous
results of the estimates of the external HBS model (inconclusive cointegration tests
results, often incorrectly signed or insignificant elasticities and problems with the ECM)
might be due to the omitted variable problem, i.e. ignoring the real exchange rate deflated
by tradable prices. If this diagnosis of the ambiguous results of the external HBS is
correct, the model to be estimated should have the form of equation (9c) rather than (9b)
in line with the suggestion in section 5.3.3. 
6.3. Policy relevance and estimation of the size of the HBS
effect
A natural follow-up of the above estimations is the quantification of the HBS effect in
CEECs. The size of the inflation differential and real appreciation associated with the
relative productivity growth has been a hotly debated issue in the region because of
concerns related to the appropriateness of the Maastricht criteria. The policy relevance of
48
M. Błaszkiewicz, P. Kowalski, Ł. Rawdanowicz, P. Woźniak
the HBS theory is that, as phrased by De Broeck and Sløk (2001), productivity gains in the
tradable sector are an equilibrium phenomenon.51 Therefore the real exchange rate
movements driven by the HBS effect do not require a policy response.  Given the relatively
strong real appreciation of all CEECs’ currencies in the transition period the bulk of the
work in this area has focused on the estimation of the size of real appreciation that could
be associated with the HBS model. The results generally point to the fact that the observed
real appreciation in the CEECs is only partly explained by the HBS effect (e.g. Egert et al.,
2002). As argued in Egert et al. (2002), estimations concerning the extent to which the
HBS effect is reflected in inflation differentials and in real exchange rate movements differ
considerably. The estimates from the literature (see Table 1) point to the productivity-
driven real appreciation in the rage of 0-3% per annum. 
It is worth stressing that the interest in the HBS effect in the CEECs context is
predominantly associated with its external version. Although, monetary authorities may be
interested in the inflation differentials between the tradable and nontradable sectors
(estimates of the internal transmission mechanisms may provide information about the
inflation differentials that are consistent with the observed differentials in the sectoral
productivity growth rates), it is unclear how in practice this information could be used
given that only economy-wide monetary policy instruments are available. 
As far as the external transmission mechanism is concerned, the presence of the HBS effect
may provide useful information about the inflation differential with respect to some foreign
country that is consistent with differentials in productivity growth rates or equivalently an
indication of real exchange appreciation which is consistent with productivity growth
differentials. In the regional context the policy relevance of productivity-driven inflation
differential (real appreciation) is strictly associated with the EU and EMU accession.
Overall, while the internal transmission mechanism is a key building block of the HBS
effect and proves to be more easily confirmed by the data (see sections 6.1 and 6.2), the
external transmission mechanism is of key importance from the policy point of view.
Since, among other criteria, the obligatory EMU membership involves the fulfilment of
inflation and nominal exchange rate stability conditions, it is argued that the estimation of
the HBS effect can be relevant for the conduct of monetary/exchange rate policies in the
run-up to EMU and, particularly, for the ERM II period. Given certain expectations of
sectoral productivity growth differentials in this period the HBS estimates may help in
setting the central parity and managing the exchange rate during the ERM II period so
that both the inflation and exchange rate criteria could be met without risking undesirable
financial market tensions. 
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51 Although it is rather problematic to evoke competitiveness in the HBS framework where only tradables
are traded internationally and the PPP is assumed to hold for them. Therefore, by definition,
competitiveness follows from the PPP and is implicitly embedded in this framework.
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Indeed, the HBS model has been frequently employed to address the feasibility and
desirability of the speedy fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria and entry to EMU by the
NMS. In this context the HBS served as a tool for assessing whether meeting
simultaneously the Maastricht criteria on inflation and on exchange rate stability could be
problematic for countries converging to the EU per capita income levels (e.g. Egert et al,
2002 citing a number of earlier contributions). Halpern and Wyplosz (2001), for example,
estimated that keeping the nominal exchange rate stable throughout the ERM II period
could create inflation rate that is higher than in the euro area by 3.5 percentage points. By
simple calculation, preventing such an inflation rate by appropriate adjustments to the
exchange rate would require a nominal appreciation of 3.5% each year representing half of
the ERMII band at the end of the ERMII period. Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) interpret this
result as a warning that the catching-up itself, leaving aside other factors affecting nominal
exchange rates, could push these countries dangerously close to the ERMII band. 
Another important consideration – and one that goes  beyond what is predicted by the
HBS effect but is nevertheless closely associated with what is predicted by the HBS – is
that a too speedy accession to the EMU may involve a trade-off between the nominal
convergence (fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria) and real convergence (growth rates).
This follows from the necessity to counteract inflation at the cost of lower economic
growth when the HBS-consistent nontradable inflation is incompatible with meeting both
Maastricht criteria.
For these reasons, investigating the size of inflation and real appreciation consistent with
the HBS effect is of utmost relevance to policymakers in NMS and other CEECs hoping to
join the EU in 2007 (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania).  As indicated earlier, a great number of
empirical studies produced point or range estimates of these effects in CEECs. We extend
this list by contributing the estimates calculated using the results of panel estimations based
on the most recent data. Table 15 and Table 16 present inflation and Table 17 the real
appreciation associated with the HBS effect for the two four-year periods: 1996-1999 and
2000-2003. The calculation of the contribution of the HBS effect to inflation was made
assuming that the growth in relative prices consistent with the growth in relative
productivities pushed up prices in the nontradable sector only (i.e. did not affect the
tradables’ inflation).52 For all countries, group-mean panel elasticities were used. Tables 15-
17 report simple averages of inflation and real appreciation over the two indicated periods. 
When FMOLS and PMGE produced different elasticities (see tables 8-14), we report
estimates based on both of them. Because the estimation of bb_03 by PMGE and hbs_01
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'theoretical' value of relative price growth consistent with the actual relative productivity growth and the
model elasticity. 
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and hbs_02 by both methods revealed critical problems with regression diagnostics or
rendered insignificant or incorrectly signed results, we do not report estimates based on
these methods.
Table 15 indicates that the estimates of contribution of the HBS-related nontradable
inflation to total inflation measured by the GVA deflator are rather dispersed: they range
from 0 percentage points (for Bulgaria) up to 3 percentage points per annum (for Poland
during the first period). Most estimates for the later period point to the HBS contribution
of well below 1.5 percentage points (with the exception of Estonia where estimates range
from 1.5 to 2.4 percentage points).
The contribution is much smaller when we look at the CPI instead of GVA deflator
presented in Table 16. This is certainly due to the fact that the share of nontradables in the
CPI basket is much smaller53 than in the GVA structure. Hence, the CPI indicator reflects
the HBS effect to a much smaller extent than do the GVA deflators. Estonia is again, the
country with the highest contribution of about 1 and 2.7 percentage points in the first and
second period, respectively. For all the other countries, significantly smaller contributions
of the HBS effect are reported, not exceeding 1.5 percentage points. 
The estimates of the contribution of the HBS effect to real appreciation are reported in
Table 17. They indicate the importance of the HBS effect in real appreciation in most
countries both in the first and second period, albeit to varying extents for different
countries. Notwithstanding the dispersion of estimates, the highest contribution of the
HBS effect to real appreciation in the first period was revealed for Poland and Hungary.
In the second period, the countries with the relatively high contribution included Estonia,
Lithuania and Romania.
There are several important caveats that have to be mentioned in relation to these
estimates. Their usefulness in the ongoing debate on the EMU accession stemming from
the policy relevance of the HBS as sketched at the beginning of this section, rests on
several simplifying assumptions that tend to be ignored by the participants of this debate. 
First, it has to be mentioned that due to focusing on panel54 elasticities in the calculation
of the HBS effect there is no room for country-specific effects related to the strength of the
relative-productivity-growth pass-through. This might be problematic when some features
of the countries’ macroeconomic regimes make the HBS visibly stronger or weaker in
comparison to the remaining countries in the panel.55
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53 While services account for about 50-70% of the GVA, they account for about 20-40% of the CPI basket
depending on the country. 
54 Using country-specific elasticities is not a good alternative. First, due to a very limited number of
observations for each country, the panel elasticities represent a clearly superior measure of the HBS
relationship which is essentially a long-run process. Second, country specific coefficients often come out
insignificant or incorrectly signed (as evidenced in tables 8-14).
55 The hypothesis related to exchange rate regime is elaborated in the next chapter.
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Second, in the absence of the country-specific effects in the applied elasticities, the
difference in the contribution of the HBS effect to inflation and real appreciation stems
from different GVA and CPI basket structure56 as well as underlying relative productivity
changes (in the case of inflation) or relative productivity differentials vis-à-vis the euro
area (in the case of real appreciation). Because the obtained estimates are based on past
data, by quoting them in the context of future EMU accession, we implicitly assume that
both the shares of nontradables in GVA and CPI as well as relative productivity
developments in CEECs and the EU will remain to be approximately the same. However,
this is not a good assumption. First, we observe a clear upward trend in the share of
nontradables both in the GVA and (particularly) in the CPI basket in CEECs, which will
act to reinforce the HBS effect. Second, the relative productivity domestic performance
and differentials vis-à-vis the euro area are very hard to forecast in the near future. While
there is a considerable consensus that over longer periods, relative productivities will rise
and relative productivity differential in CEECs will be positive, it does not have to be the
case during several future years when most countries plan to enter the ERMII. This is
evident from Table 2 which indicates that in recent years relative productivity changes and
relative productivity differentials have often been close to zero or even negative (e.g. Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Poland). 
Therefore, assuming that in line with the long-term trend the relative productivity growth
in CEECs will be positive in the near future and will outpace that in the euro area, thus
producing a sizeable HBS effect, is burdened with a substantial risk. In general, as chapter
2 made clear, the HBS is a long-run theory and inferences from its estimations are better
used in a longer perspective. While the empirical results obtained from panel regressions
can, they do not have to be indicative of developments in the run-up to the euro adoption.
The ERM II period could last only two years, and no more than one year matters for
inflation criterion. In a longer perspective to which the HBS is suited, this period might
be too short to make any model-related conclusions (such as contribution estimates
presented in this section) of real value for policymakers. 
Finally, as mentioned in section 5.1.2, it might be inappropriate to assume that the entire
nontradable component of the price indices is subject to the HBS effect due to the
administrative character of price changes and the detachment of the productivity-price
link (Egert et al., 2002). This is a factor reducing the importance of the HBS effect in all
countries, albeit to varying degrees depending on the scale of the administratively
controlled sector. Since it is hard to predict the direction and the pace of changes in the
administratively controlled sectors, the specific parts of the nontradable sector that are
not subject to the HBS effect, will remain unknown. As these sectors are likely to undergo
52
M. Błaszkiewicz, P. Kowalski, Ł. Rawdanowicz, P. Woźniak
56 The share of nontradables in GVA and in the CPI consumption basket.
CASE Reports No. 57
CASE Reports No. 57
dynamic changes in several years to come, our ability to infer from the estimates based on
past data about the future size of the effect, might be seriously impaired.
It is important to keep in mind that all the abovementioned caveats concern using the
estimates of the HBS effect calculated conventionally with the use of the regression
elasticities and actual productivity and price data from the sample. It was not, however,
meant to undermine the use of the HBS theory in the general context of analysing inflation
and real appreciation in CEECs.
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Given the potential policy context in which the estimations of the HBS have been pursued
(see Section 6.3), it is somewhat surprising that very few of the existing contributions
make a distinction between the exchange rate regimes adopted in the investigated
economies. Presumably, one of the main reasons for the absence of this distinction is that
the HBS theory does not in itself distinguish between different modes of realisation of the
internal and external transmission mechanisms. As discussed above, according to the HBS
theory, the real appreciation can materialise via various combinations of
inflation/deflation and nominal appreciation/depreciation. This may be seen as
problematic both from the empirical point of view and in the context of usefulness of the
HBS theory for economic policy making. 
7.1. Different Modes of Realization of HBS Effect and the Role
of Nominal Exchange Rate
According to the HBS theory, the changes in relative prices will not unambiguously lead
to inflation being higher in absolute terms in the fast growing country though they will
unambiguously lead to an appreciation of the CPI based real exchange rate. The real
appreciation according to this model occurs through inflation being higher in the faster
growing country. Since the HBS theory does not assume anything about the nominal
exchange rate apart from the law of one price in the tradable sector, the HBS real
appreciation is consistent with any combination of nominal exchange rate change and CPI
inflation as long as the underlying relative price differentials are consistent with the
relative productivity differentials. For example, if the HBS internal and external
transmission is accompanied by a nominal appreciation of an exchange rate, domestic
inflation of tradables goes down allowing the domestic inflation differential (implied by
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the HBS) to be achieved with a lower inflation in nontradables: the same real appreciation
is realised with a lower aggregate inflation.
The adopted exchange rate regime does impose constraints on the way in which the HBS
can operate. In a fixed exchange rate regime the HBS effect will necessarily have to occur
through nominal wage adjustments and nontradable inflation. In the case of a downward
inflexibility of the exchange rate (e.g. when monetary authorities abstain from
devaluations) the HBS effect will have to be realised through a combination of the
tradable deflation, nominal wage adjustment and nontradable inflation.57 In the case of an
upward inflexibility of the exchange rate (monetary authorities abstain from nominal
appreciation but accept depreciation) the HBS effect will have to occur through a
combination of inflation in both sectors and nominal wage adjustments. In a flexible
exchange rate regime with unconstrained nominal exchange rate movements the HBS can
occur through any combination of the above-mentioned mechanisms. 
As a consequence, estimates of the HBS effect may differ according to the constraints
imposed by the nominal exchange rate regimes. In the short run due to differentials in the
flexibility of nominal exchange rates and prices (and wages) in the tradable and
nontradable sectors the dynamics of achieving the HBS effect may be affected. For
example assuming higher flexibility of nominal exchange rates as compared to commodity
prices it can be expected that the adjustment to the equilibrium as indicated by the HBS
effect may be more rapid under flexible exchange rates as compared to a fixed exchange
rate regime. Similarly, if prices are less flexible downwards it may take longer for the HBS
effect to feed through in an exchange rate regime in which the exchange rate is
characterised by a downward rigidity. 
This is indeed the hypothesis put forward as an explanation of differences in estimated
coefficients of the HBS model for different exchange rate regime sub-groups obtained by
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001). They explicitly include the exchange rate regime as an
explanatory variable in their panel estimations of the relationship between the services to
industrial products price ratio and measures of productivity in the two sectors although
the exact specification of the equation they estimate is somewhat unclear. Seemingly, the
base panel that Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) use for the estimation of the HBS effect is
divided into two sub-panels: one containing the observations for exchange rate regimes
without any formal commitment (managed or free floating), and one for all remaining
exchange rate regimes. The effect of productivity in the traded goods sector increases
under “no commitment” regime and the coefficient on the nontraded sector productivity
changes signs. Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) conclude that a floating exchange rate regime
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“strengthens” the HBS effect which they find as hardly surprising. The interpretation is
that if the exchange rate is free to absorb some of the equilibrium real appreciation in the
form of a nominal appreciation rather than forcing the adjustment through absolute price
changes, the effect is bound to appear faster. This is supposed to be making the difference
given the short time-series. The authors expect that with the longer time series, such
nominal short-term rigidities should vanish. They do not, however, provide and further
investigation of this hypothesis.  
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) are the only known contribution to the HBS theory that
distinguishes between the exchange rate regimes – a clear indication of a gap to be filled.
Additionally, some questions can be raised about the robustness of estimates by Halpern
and Wyplosz (2001). They specify their equation as an unobserved effect panel data model
and estimate it with a range of estimators (fixed effects, random effects, FGLS, OLS).
Nevertheless, model specification and in particular the inclusion of lagged dependent
variable as an explanatory variable in panel estimations results in violation of the strict
exogeneity assumption (Woolbride, 2002). Violation of this assumption results in
inconsistency of all above-mentioned estimators. Finally, Halpern’s and Wyplosz’s (2001)
results are based on a very small sample of observations. Annual observations for nine
countries in the period 1990-2000, after accounting for some gaps in the data, offer only
56 observations which then further divided into two separate sub-panels. Overall, there is
a considerable interest in verifying Halpern’s and Wyplosz’s  (2001) results both from the
scientific/academic and policy point of view. 
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the HBS effect can generate various magnitudes of
inflation (and various magnitudes of exchange rage movements), the exogeneity of
productivity growth may be considered a weak element of the HBS theory. In fact, Andres
et al. (1996) address a related question. They make an observation that according to the
HBS theory growth and inflation are positively correlated in economies with pegged
currencies as well as the costs of inflation are underestimated in samples that include
countries and periods with different exchange rate regimes. They do not, however,
comment on the fact that whether observed inflation is driven by the HBS effect or by other
factors it will still impose an economic cost and may affect the productivity growth itself. 
Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) are more explicit and state that inflation differentials
associated with the HBS effect reflect an equilibrium phenomenon, without any negative
implications. This statement, however, is not convincing as even if the HBS inflation does
not undermine international competitiveness, it may still be associated with economic
costs and impinge upon productivity growth itself – especially if the productivity growth
differentials are large generating high rates of HBS inflation. If this is the case, it could be
argued that the usefulness of an estimate of the HBS effect based on a flexible exchange
rate regime period (with presumably lower resulting HBS inflation) will be of limited
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usefulness in the period in which the country adopted a fixed exchange rate (with
presumably higher resulting HBS inflation) as the productivity growth could itself be
affected.  This would be especially the case if the HBS effect involves nonlinearities:
estimated HBS elasticities change with different levels of productivity growth rates.
Arguably, this is not the case in the standard exposition of the model but these functional
forms, while mathematically convenient and economically appealing, cannot be taken for
granted. Chang (2002) suggests a possibility of structural breaks in the context of HBS
effect estimation and existence of different exchange rate regimes.
In this context, the existing estimates of the HBS real appreciation, suggest that fixed
nominal exchange rate would be associated with rather moderate inflation levels and that
nominal exchange rate appreciation would not make much of a difference. Put together
with the consensual view that costs of inflation are low for low inflation levels may suggest
that there is no big difference whether the HBS real appreciation in the CEECs is realised
through higher inflation levels or absorbed partially or entirely by the nominal
appreciation. This argument, however, does not take into account that the potential for
nonHBS inflation in the CEECs may be already higher than in other countries and that
even moderate increments associated with the HBS may make a difference. Additionally,
as we pointed out in section 6.3, the estimates of the HBS effect are always conditional on
the dynamics of underlying catch-up process. A faster catch-up after the EU accession may
generate higher resulting HBS effect which if coupled with a fixed exchange rate regime
may result in inflation rates that may make a difference. 
In addition to exchange rate-related heterogeneity of realisation of the internal
transmission mechanism, the realisation of the HBS may be additionally affected by
associated behaviour of the nominal exchange rate through the PPP (or its violation) in the
tradable sector. Rawdanowicz (2004) suggests that since “PPP is based primarily on
international arbitrage, it seems more reasonable to expect to find evidence for PPP under
fixed exchange rate regimes than under floats. The arbitrage is less likely to occur (or
occur in a less smooth manner) when changes in nominal exchange rates are volatile and
unpredictable – the usual feature of floating exchange rates.”  It has to be pointed out that,
the principle of arbitrage itself does not suffice for expectations that the violation of the
PPP is more likely in flexible exchange rate regimes–nominal exchange rate volatility can
in principle itself be caused by arbitrage in commodity markets. As a matter of fact
exchange rate flexibility may facilitate arbitrage. Nevertheless, in line with what is argued
further in Rawdanowicz (2004), exchange rate volatility that is detached from the goods
markets will blur the price comparison and may result in emergence of the so-called no-
arbitrage thresholds.
The presented discussion suggests that while the HBS theory is not very well positioned
to provide a basis for an assessment of alternative exchange rate regimes, its mechanics
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as well as policy relevance may be linked to the issue of exchange rate regimes. Since
assumptions about the behaviour of nominal exchange rate constrain the modes of
realisation of the HBS effect and thus require different sets of adjustments in
macroeconomic variables, the regime in place may affect the extent to which the
productivity differentials transmit to real appreciation. For example a fixed nominal
exchange rate requires internal adjustment through nominal wage and nontradable prices
while a floating exchange rate regime will usually require tradable price adjustment but
not necessarily wage and nontradable price adjustments. Depending on relative stickiness
of these variables, the final outcome of the internal transmission mechanism may differ
between different modes of realisation of the HBS and may affect the HBS estimates. It is
therefore interesting to account for such heterogeneity in the estimation of coefficients. 
7.2. Empirical Verification
The previous sections explained why accounting for heterogeneity associated with
differentials in nominal exchange rate behaviour could be important in the context of
estimating the HBS effect. In what follows we present results of estimations of three
models of the internal transmission mechanism (bb_01, bb_02, and bb_03) and one model
of external transmission mechanism (hbs_03) accounting for an impact of adopted
exchange rate regimes. The results are presented in Tables 18-22. 
Two methodological approaches are pursued. In the first approach the influence of an
adopted exchange rate regime is estimated with the panel group mean FMOLS estimator
on two separate sub-panels: one containing observations where a commitment to an
exchange rate target (commit=1 in Table 18) was present and one containing observations
where there was no such commitment (commit=0).58 The second approach attempts the
estimation of the selected HBS model specifications with an inclusion of explicit
commitment dummies. The latter set of estimations are pursued with standard panel data
techniques such as fixed and random effects, feasible generalised least squares with
heterogenous panels and autocorrelated standard errors (FGLS) as well as the panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Tables 21-22).  For the sake of comparison, estimations
for specifications with and without the exchange rate commitment dummy are presented
for each of the model and estimator employed.
The FMOLS estimations pertaining to the internal transmission mechanism models
(bb_01, bb_02, and bb_03) yield statistically significant coefficients which tend to indicate
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a larger magnitude of the internal HBS effect for no-commitment regimes. This is the case
for bb_02 and bb_03 models while the opposite result is obtained for the bb_01 model.
FMOLS estimations of the external transmission mechanism render results that are
statistically questionable – a confirmation of the conclusion drawn from the analysis in
Chapter 6.
The estimation of the internal transmission mechanism with regime-commitment
dummies generally indicates lower estimated coefficients on measures of relative
productivity. Nevertheless, (1) the coefficients on regime dummies are statistically
significant and positive; (2) constants estimated in the specifications with the regime
commitment dummies are generally lower. One general observation that follows from
these results is that accounting for the regime commitment seems to matter. Since the
estimated coefficients on relative productivity are in most cases lower in specifications
with the regime dummies, one conclusion that could be drawn is that the inference based
on basic estimations (without accounting for the regime) would tend to overstate the size
of the HBS effect for both types of exchange rate regimes but marginally more so for a
commitment regime. This is however where a straightforward interpretation of these
results stops. The consistently positive estimates of coefficients on regime dummies
indicate a positive impact of a commitment on the relationship between the relative
productivity and relative prices – a result that is counterintuitive in the context of
discussion in Section 7.1.
Estimation of the external transmission mechanism with the regime commitment
dummies is inconclusive. While coefficients on regime-commitment dummies are
statistically significant they change signs between different estimators. More importantly,
the coefficients on relative productivity variables denote low statistical significance. Once
again, these estimates complete the picture of generally inconclusive results of estimations
of the external HBS effect discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
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Our research sought to investigate the HBS effect in CEECs. Prior to estimating the model,
detailed analyses of several key assumptions of the model were pursued. First, potential
problems arising from the inability to make a precise division of the economy into the
tradable and nontradable sector was raised. The problems stem from controversies regarding
the classification of many industries or services as well as difficulties to obtain data at a
sufficiently disaggregated level. It was shown how the failure to make an appropriate division
may introduce noise to the series and result in biased estimates of coefficients. Also the wage
equalisation assumption of the HBS model was investigated. It was found that while the
absolute wage equalisation (equal wage levels) may be difficult to prove, evidence for
stationary wage ratios (i.e. common wage changes) was easier to find. We showed that the
stationarity of wage ratios was enough to keep the accounting of the HBS-model unchanged.
Also a verification of the PPP model (another key assumption of the HBS model) in our
sample was attempted rendering no clear empirical evidence in its favour.
In the empirical part of the paper, the Pedroni panel-stationarity tests led us to conclude
that the variables used in subsequent estimations (productivities, prices levels and the euro
exchange rate) are stationary in first differences. Panel cointegration tests (also due to
Pedroni) detected the existence of cointegration in the internal HBS (three alternative
formulations of the model) and only partly in the external HBS (four alternative
formulations of the model). Similar evidence resulted from panel estimations with the use
of the panel group mean FMOLS and PMGE methods. While the internal HBS
relationship proved to be significant and robust to alternative model formulation, the
evidence concerning the external HBS was less convincing and sensitive to the selection
of the model. Such results could be reconciled with the findings about the extent to which
key assumptions of the model hold in our panel. Evidence of stable wage ratios (and a lack
of absolute wage equalisation) seemed sufficient for the realisation of the internal HBS,
but the failure of PPP was believed to be potentially the main reason for ambiguous
empirical results of the external HBS regressions.   
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Based on the regression estimates of elasticities we calculated the contribution of the HBS
effect to inflation and real exchange rate appreciation during two four-year periods: 1996-
1999 and 2000-2003. Our estimates of annual contribution of the HBS effect to inflation
(generally below 2 percentage points in the later period) and to real appreciation
(generally below 3 percentage points in the later period) must be interpreted with caution.
This was motivated, among others, by the fact that they were based on past relative
productivity growth and differentials vis-à-vis the euro area which on average, exhibited,
positive trends in our sample. Both productivity indicators are, however, subject to short-
run fluctuations which may lead to negligible or even negative HBS effect. Thus, we
stressed that the HBS theory, being the long-run theory, was better suited for inferring
about long-run trends of relative inflation and real appreciation of exchange rates rather
than for producing point estimates of these indicators for a specific two or three-year
period.
In the last part of the paper the hypothesis of the potential impact of exchange rate
regimes on the significance and size of the HBS effect postulated in the literature was
discussed. Two distinct modes of realisation of the HBS effect were identified and
elaborated. In a fixed exchange rate regime the HBS effect would necessarily have to
occur through nominal wage adjustments and nontradable inflation, while in the flexible
exchange rate regime, nominal exchange rate movements could facilitate adjustment of
relative prices without wage adjustments. Thus, it was demonstrated that flexible
exchange rate regimes could smooth the realisation of the HBS effect (i.e. adjustments to
the equilibrium suggested by the HBS). We attempted an empirical verification of these
hypotheses but failed to obtain clear-cut results. Estimations picked up a statistically
significant impact of regimes on HBS estimates and showed that failing to account for
their heterogeneity would tend to overstate the size of the HBS effect for both types of
exchange rate regimes. However, they also indicated a positive impact of a commitment
to an exchange rate target on the relationship between the relative productivity and
relative prices – a result that is counterintuitive in the context of the discussion preceding
the estimations. 
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Table 1. Selected empirical studies of the HBS effect in CEECs
Sectoral decompositionStudy
Author(s)
Country
Sample
Dependent
Variable Tradables Nontradables
Other
explanatory
variables
Estimation
method
Estimate
the BS
effect
(percentage
points per
annum)
Kovács and Simon
(1998)
Hungary, 1991–96
REER Manufacturing
(excluding
agriculture,
mining and
energy)
Services
(excluding
public
administration)
— No
regressions
2.9
Cipriani (2001)
10 accession
candidates,
1995–99,
quarterly data
PN/PT
(NT/T goods
and services
from CPI)
Industry and
mining (goods
from CPI)
Residual
(excluding
agriculture),
services from
CPI
— OLS 0.5–0.7
De Broeck and
Sløk
(2001)
25 transition
economies, 1993–
98
REER Industry and
construction
Services Agricultural
productivity,
broad money,
openness,
budget balance,
terms of trade,
commodity
prices
Pooled
mean group
estimation
0.2–0.6
Egert (2002a)
12 transition
economies, 1993–
2001, quarterly
data
PN/PT
(CPI/PPI)
RER (D-mark)
Industry Not
considered
(productivity
set at zero)
— VAR and
panel
cointegration
0.9
(pooled
estimates)
0–3.5
(country
estimates)
Fischer (2002)
10 accession
candidates, 1993–
99
REER Industry Services Agricultural
productivity, gvt
cons/GDP, world
real interest rate,
terms of trade,
commodity
prices
SUR fixed
effects
0.7–2.2
(partly
attributed
to investment
demand
channel)
Halpern and
Wyplosz
(2001)
8 accession
candidates, Russia,
1991–98
PN/PT
(services/
nonfood
manufactured
goods from
CPI)
Industry Services GDP per capita,
inflation
acceleration
term, lagged
relative price
GLS 3.0
Coricelli and
Jazbec
(2001)
19 transition
economies, 1990–
98
PT/PN
(sectoral GDP
deflators)
Manufacturing,
mining, energy
and
construction
Residual Share of
nontradables
consumption,
government
consumption,
“structural
misalignment”
measure
Fixed effects
panel
estimation
0.9–1.2
Arratibel et al
(2002)
10 accession
candidates, 1990–
2001
PN/PT
(CPI
decomposition
of NT/T goods
and services)
Manufacturing Not
considered
Exchange rate
regime, budget
deficit, GDP per
capita, wage
growth,
unemployment,
oil price, terms of
trade, etc
Method of
moments
Insignificant
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Notes: For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I
Table 2. Average annual growth rates of absolute and relative productivities in CEECs  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 sample average
RPRO1_BUL 1.3 0.2 2.0 1.2
RPRO1_CZE . 5.1 20.5 3.5 -10.6 -2.4 12.3 -6.9 -8.2 -7.3 0.7
RPRO1_EST 1.7 -14.2 0.7 11.6 -3.0 -3.0 2.4 3.5 8.0 12.9 2.1
RPRO1_HUN . . 1.6 6.4 0.3 7.3 5.3 -6.5 -7.6 -6.9 0.0
RPRO1_LAT . . . . . . . . -5.4 2.3 -1.5
RPRO1_LIT . . 9.0 -3.0 4.9 -3.4 -0.6 6.5 5.3 2.3 2.6
RPRO1_POL . . 5.5 6.2 1.4 1.5 8.2 -1.8 -0.8 1.6 2.7
RPRO1_ROM . . . . . 3.5 11.8 5.6 -3.3 -11.6 1.2
RPRO1_SLK . . 2.8 -18.6 5.2 8.3 -1.2 -1.1 -7.9 -7.9 -2.6
RPRO1_SLO . . . . 1.3 1.1 2.7 2.5 1.0 0.4 1.5
RPRO2_BUL . . . . . . . 2.5 3.2 1.6 2.4
RPRO2_CZE . 3.8 22.2 4.7 -7.2 2.0 10.8 -6.1 -7.6 -7.0 1.7
RPRO2_EST 6.1 4.4 0.6 10.9 -2.8 0.2 3.0 1.0 5.1 10.0 3.9
RPRO2_HUN . . 0.8 6.1 0.4 7.7 4.2 -0.4 -2.9 -4.2 1.5
RPRO2_LAT . . . . . . . . 0.1 1.9 1.0
RPRO2_LIT . . 7.3 7.9 -0.2 -3.1 2.5 14.0 12.3 5.6 5.8
RPRO2_POL . . 5.9 10.9 7.3 4.0 0.9 -5.2 -5.3 -3.6 1.9
RPRO2_ROM . . . . . -2.1 -3.4 8.8 10.2 13.5 5.4
RPRO2_SLK . . 4.6 -15.0 8.1 11.3 1.8 -0.3 -7.3 -9.9 -0.9
RPRO2_SLO . . . . 7.8 5.1 2.3 -1.6 -0.8 0.2 2.2
PRO_T1_BUL . . . . . . . 7.9 5.7 6.1 6.6
PRO_T1_CZE . 7.8 17.9 2.9 -6.9 1.4 12.3 -1.7 -2.4 -2.2 3.2
PRO_T1_EST 3.3 -0.6 7.0 19.9 4.3 2.4 11.4 8.3 10.1 14.8 8.1
PRO_T1_HUN . . 3.8 9.4 3.0 6.1 7.6 -1.3 -1.9 -1.6 3.2
PRO_T1_LAT . . . . . . . . -2.8 3.5 0.3
PRO_T1_LIT . . 9.6 4.1 13.0 -3.3 7.6 15.7 15.6 14.5 9.6
PRO_T1_POL . . 8.0 9.4 4.5 9.5 11.3 2.0 3.0 5.4 6.6
PRO_T1_ROM . . . . . 4.7 14.0 9.9 8.7 7.1 8.9
PRO_T1_SLK . . 4.8 -7.7 7.4 9.8 2.9 4.1 0.6 0.1 2.7
PRO_T1_SLO . . . . 3.2 7.0 12.2 3.3 2.5 2.5 5.1
PRO_T2_BUL . . . . . . . 10.9 10.6 7.3 9.6
PRO_T2_CZE . 6.7 17.7 3.3 -4.1 4.4 10.6 -0.7 -1.5 -1.6 3.9
PRO_T2_EST 5.3 14.3 6.7 18.1 4.7 4.7 11.7 6.2 7.5 11.9 9.1
PRO_T2_HUN . . 3.2 8.8 3.1 5.9 6.6 3.4 1.8 0.7 4.2
PRO_T2_LAT . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.9 2.2
PRO_T2_LIT . . 7.7 10.6 8.1 -3.5 9.8 20.2 19.7 16.4 11.1
PRO_T2_POL . . 7.3 11.2 7.6 10.4 5.7 -0.1 -0.1 1.3 5.4
PRO_T2_ROM . . . . . -0.9 0.3 11.2 14.7 20.0 9.0
PRO_T2_SLK . . 5.9 -4.0 8.8 11.1 4.8 4.9 1.6 -0.9 4.0
PRO_T2_SLO . . . . 6.7 8.9 11.5 0.6 1.4 2.4 5.2
PRO_NT_BUL . . . . . . . 8.2 7.2 5.6 7.0
PRO_NT_CZE . 2.9 -3.8 -1.3 3.3 2.2 -0.1 5.9 6.6 5.8 2.4
PRO_NT_EST -1.0 9.5 6.2 6.3 7.8 4.3 8.6 5.0 2.4 1.6 5.1
PRO_NT_HUN . . 2.4 2.4 2.7 -1.7 2.4 3.8 4.8 5.1 2.7
PRO_NT_LAT . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.2 1.4
PRO_NT_LIT . . 0.5 2.4 8.1 -0.1 6.9 5.3 6.5 10.7 5.1
PRO_NT_POL . . 1.4 0.3 0.3 6.0 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.1 3.6
PRO_NT_ROM . . . . . 1.5 3.3 1.7 4.3 6.3 3.4
PRO_NT_SLK . . 1.3 12.7 0.9 -0.4 3.3 5.4 9.0 9.7 5.2
PRO_NT_SLO . . . . -1.1 3.6 9.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 3.0
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Notes: For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I
Table 3. Average annual growth rates of relative prices and real exchange rates in CEECs
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 sample average
RP1_BUL . 5.2 -3.5 6.9 1.2 -0.1 -6.2 3.5 5.6 6.5 2.1
RP1_CZE 4.6 1.4 3.9 3.3 5.6 1.1 -0.9 1.8 2.8 3.2 2.7
RP1_EST 8.5 2.5 7.2 2.0 3.9 4.6 -0.8 1.3 2.4 3.0 3.5
RP1_HUN 5.9 0.0 1.3 -1.7 2.5 4.7 -0.9 3.9 5.9 7.0 2.9
RP1_LAT 16.4 11.7 3.5 4.1 2.8 6.6 2.0 0.8 1.0 1.1 5.0
RP1_LIT . 9.0 6.3 4.5 12.6 -1.7 -13.5 6.3 8.2 9.4 4.6
RP1_POL 1.8 1.7 6.3 2.5 4.2 1.5 2.1 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.1
RP1_ROM 0.7 -2.2 -7.1 -1.3 19.3 1.2 -4.9 -4.9 -3.1 -1.7 -0.4
RP1_SLK 3.2 0.8 1.6 1.6 3.3 6.5 2.1 0.7 1.8 2.2 2.4
RP1_SLO 2.8 0.7 2.8 2.2 1.8 4.0 1.1 -0.5 0.4 1.0 1.6
RP2_BUL . . . . -11.7 -6.8 1.0 0.5 0.0 -1.2 -3.0
RP2_CZE . 4.8 3.3 9.9 -4.7 -1.1 6.7 -5.8 -5.3 -3.7 0.5
RP2_EST 1.6 7.4 3.2 4.7 -1.6 4.2 -1.3 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.7
RP2_HUN . . . . . . . . . . .
RP2_LAT 12.9 -9.8 4.8 0.2 21.3 7.1 3.9 0.3 0.5 1.5 4.3
RP2_LIT . . 10.3 0.7 8.3 -2.0 -4.0 3.7 4.8 5.5 3.4
RP2_POL . . 10.9 8.8 7.1 0.7 6.5 6.5 5.7 4.2 6.3
RP2_ROM . . . . . 5.0 2.0 3.8 3.6 -0.3 2.8
RP2_SLK -2.4 2.3 9.7 1.8 1.7 -3.9 -1.4 1.1 0.1 2.0 1.1
RP2_SLO . . . . . . . . . . .
RP3_BUL . . 1.8 -3.0 30.6 22.3 -1.8 7.0 8.9 10.1 9.5
RP3_CZE . 1.9 7.1 6.2 6.4 3.8 -0.1 4.6 6.3 7.1 4.8
RP3_EST 33.9 16.1 11.0 5.4 10.0 11.0 0.5 2.8 3.9 4.6 9.9
RP3_HUN 7.2 -1.8 3.7 -1.0 4.3 9.3 -1.0 4.4 6.6 8.1 4.0
RP3_LAT 43.8 27.7 8.1 11.5 9.5 9.5 4.7 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 11.5
RP3_LIT . 11.5 3.6 10.9 19.5 3.6 -9.8 9.7 11.2 13.0 8.1
RP3_POL 1.5 2.8 6.7 6.3 9.3 5.0 3.1 7.0 7.2 6.3 5.5
RP3_ROM 6.4 5.6 -1.5 9.9 45.2 20.7 10.1 -11.7 -6.7 0.1 7.8
RP3_SLK . . 1.6 2.4 5.1 19.4 14.8 7.1 6.4 5.5 7.8
RP3_SLO 7.3 5.0 7.9 3.8 3.9 5.6 0.3 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.1
RER1_BUL . . . . 28.4 6.5 6.6 -0.6 3.5 0.0 7.4
RER1_CZE . 9.9 6.7 15.4 6.7 6.9 -2.1 -6.5 -3.9 -7.8 2.8
RER1_EST 32.7 24.4 23.4 14.4 11.1 2.5 3.2 3.4 3.0 2.5 12.1
RER1_HUN . . . . . . . . . . .
RER1_LAT 4.4 15.7 16.9 2.4 -0.7 2.7 -6.2 -4.5 0.2 -0.5 3.0
RER1_LIT . . 17.8 2.1 -2.4 -1.8 -11.3 -10.2 -5.7 -7.1 -2.3
RER1_POL . . 28.3 27.3 12.5 17.8 2.5 -11.3 -7.3 -5.4 8.0
RER1_ROM . . . . . 138.7 79.0 68.7 61.4 46.0 78.7
RER1_SLK 12.0 11.1 4.6 7.9 2.7 22.7 4.4 -1.5 0.8 -2.3 6.2
RER1_SLO . . . . . . . . . . .
RER2_BUL 277.6 108.4 605.2 7801.8 16.8 5.0 9.5 -0.4 4.2 1.2 882.9
RER2_CZE 2.1 8.8 8.3 13.2 5.8 7.5 -0.4 -7.0 -4.2 -8.4 2.5
RER2_EST 42.5 21.3 22.5 13.1 7.8 1.2 1.9 3.3 2.8 2.4 11.9
RER2_HUN 28.3 66.5 45.0 29.4 23.1 19.4 12.0 0.0 0.7 -4.1 22.0
RER2_LAT 6.1 27.4 19.5 2.4 -0.3 -0.2 -8.7 -4.6 0.7 -0.4 4.2
RER2_LIT 51.1 51.5 21.1 -2.5 -1.5 -1.0 -13.3 -9.0 -3.7 -4.7 8.8
RER2_POL 57.4 47.0 29.3 25.0 11.9 19.6 3.6 -10.6 -6.4 -4.3 17.2
RER2_ROM 353.0 75.3 104.8 425.9 85.6 146.9 76.5 62.6 59.8 49.9 144.0
RER2_SLK 10.9 10.2 6.2 4.2 4.9 27.2 7.1 1.7 4.1 -0.1 7.6
RER2_SLO 29.3 12.9 22.1 14.3 5.3 14.0 14.4 6.7 11.0 7.3 13.7
RER3_BUL . 100.6 659.5 7178.9 17.0 6.3 13.6 -2.8 0.7 -2.6 885.7
RER3_CZE -1.6 6.1 5.9 10.1 1.7 6.4 -1.4 -7.9 -5.3 -9.6 0.4
RER3_EST 32.0 9.9 15.7 10.6 4.2 -3.4 1.2 2.2 1.5 0.7 7.5
RER3_HUN . . 45.0 32.1 21.0 14.8 11.3 -3.4 -3.8 -9.0 13.5
RER3_LAT -6.0 13.7 16.1 -1.2 -2.8 -6.5 -13.0 -4.1 2.0 1.2 -0.1
RER3_LIT 27.0 36.6 15.6 -5.7 -11.2 2.0 0.2 -10.6 -6.7 -7.7 4.0
RER3_POL 53.7 42.5 22.9 19.1 8.4 18.2 -1.5 -14.5 -10.0 -6.7 13.2
RER3_ROM . . . . 60.9 140.5 79.6 80.2 71.8 56.8 81.6
RER3_SLK . . 6.7 3.9 3.0 20.3 1.5 1.3 3.0 -1.4 4.8
RER3_SLO 15.1 9.3 20.0 12.3 4.9 11.5 10.9 9.3 13.7 9.4 11.6
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Notes: Rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level.
Methodological details in Appendix II
Table 4. Panel Unit Root Test Statistics 
Without trend
LL Tests IPS Test
ñ
statistic
ñ -t
statistic
ADF
statistic
ADF
statistic
PT 0.38 -0.42 1.80 1.76
PT2 0.27 -0.85 1.53 0.92
PNT2 0.72 -0.87 1.70 0.81
DEF 0.74 -0.89 1.80 1.38
PRO_T1 1.56 1.83 2.6 2.51
PRO_T2 1.37 1.34 2.28 1.81
PRO_NT2 1.92 2.33 2.20 2.70
CPI 0.74 -1.33 * 3.17 3.41
EUR -1.13 -0.59 0.61 -0.96
PPI 0.48 -1.05 2.28 7.33
CPI_NT 1.14 -0.14 3.04 4.43
With trend
LL Tests IPS Test
ñ
statistic
ñ -t
statistic
ADF
statistic
ADF
statistic
PT 0.28 -0.54 -0.07 -0.73
PT2 -0.04 -0.65 0.33 0.75
PNT2 3.25 0.40 0.85 1.17
DEF 3.31 0.49 0.84 1.38
PRO_T1 -6.82 *** -2.42 *** -1.92 ** -3.46 ***
PRO_T2 -4.38 *** -1.41 * -1.26 -1.94 **
PRO_NT2 -5.52 *** -1.76 ** -1.08 -1.43 *
CPI 3.73 0.49 1.38 1.62
EUR -2.31 * -1.43 * -1.05 -2.15 **
PPI 3.35 0.51 0.46 -4.28 ***
CPI_NT 4.71 0.96 2.12 4.80
ρ ρ
ρ ρ -t
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Notes: t-ratios in parentheses. Countries included in the panel: BUL, CZE, EST, HUN, LAT, LIT,
POL, SLK, and SLO. For variable sources and definitions see section 3.1 and  Appendix I.
Table 5. PPP test - model (17a) 
FMOLS estimates PMGE estimates MGE estimates
Dependent variable   PPIM PPIM PPIM
Explanatory variables
PPP (EUR + PPIM_EUR) 0.991 (39.487) 0.950 (38.510)   0.800 ( 5.969)   
Error Correction (Phi) -0.086 (-4.551)    -0.123 (-5.773)
No. of countries 9 9 9
No. of quarters 
by countries
37 42 39 34 40 40 
42 34 39
33 38 35 30 36 36 
  38 30 35
33 38 35 30 36 36 
  38 30 35
Lag truncation/
maximum lag
4 4 4
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses. Countries included in the panel: BUL, CZE, EST, HUN, LAT, LIT,
POL, SLK, and SLO. For variable sources and definitions see section 3.1 and  Appendix I.
Table 6. PPP test - model (17a) excluding Lithuania
FMOLS estimates PMGE estimates MGE estimates
Dependent variable   PPIM PPIM PPIM
Explanatory variables
PPP (EUR + PPIM_EUR) 1.269 (42.630) 0.952 (39.037)    0.915 ( 7.869)   
Error Correction (Phi) -0.088 (-4.107)    -0.126 (-5.274)
No. of countries 8 8 8
No. of quarters 
by countries
37 42 39 34 40
42 34 39
34 39 36 31 37
39 31 36
34 39 36 31 37 39
31 36
Lag truncation/
maximum lag
4 3 3
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Notes: Rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or1%(***) significance level.
Methodological details in Appendix II
Table 7. Panel Cointegration Test Statistics  
Without trend
panel group
υ
variance
statistic
ñ
statistic 
t
statistic
non-para-
metric 
t
statistic
parametric
 
ñ
statistic 
t
statistic
non-para-
metric 
t
statistic
parametric
 
bb_01 1.64 * -2.78 *** -2.43 *** -2.04 ** -2.21 ** -2.94 *** -1.59 *
bb_02 2.10 ** -4.19 *** -3.74 *** -2.20 ** -3.60 *** -4.68 *** -0.59
bb_03 -1.92 1.34 1.11 1.48 1.05 0.44 0.30
hbs_01 -1.32 0.72 0.01 0.82 0.91 -0.65 0.17
hbs_02 -1.15 0.23 -0.13 -0.34 1.22 0.44 -0.09
hbs_03 -1.40 0.58 -0.18 0.26 0.28 -1.22 -0.38
hbs_04 -1.32 0.21 -0.33 -0.54 0.23 -0.54 -0.37
With trend
panel group
υ
variance
statistic
ñ
statistic 
t
statistic
non-para-
metric 
t
statistic
parametric
 
ñ
statistic 
t
statistic
non-para-
metric 
t
statistic
parametric
 
bb_01 1.03 -3.03 *** -3.80 *** -3.26 *** -1.67 ** -3.81 *** -2.91 ***
bb_02 1.40 * -3.38 *** -4.00 *** -2.70 *** -2.01 ** -4.04 *** -1.84 **
bb_03 1.69 ** 1.30 0.79 -0.20 2.28 1.26 0.05
hbs_01 0.42 -0.82 -1.50 * -1.91 ** -0.05 -1.55 * -1.96 **
hbs_02 -0.20 0.20 -0.90 -0.61 0.16 -1.67 ** -1.23
hbs_03 1.10 -2.47 *** -3.93 *** -4.40 *** -1.76 ** -4.49 *** -4.78 ***
hbs_04 0.35 -1.11 -3.08 *** -3.45 *** -1.27 -4.25 *** -3.83 ***
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 8. Estimation of the internal HBS (bb_01)
MODEL bb_01: 
dependent variable: RP1
explanatory variables PRO1 
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (16/12) -0.85 **
CZE (40/36) 0.54 *** -0.61 ***
EST (44/40) 0.77 *** -0.19 **
LIT (36/32) 0.91 *** -0.28 ***
POL (36/32) 1.16 *** -0.11 ***
ROM (24/20) 0.14 -0.23 *
SLK (36/32) -0.20 -0.14 **
PANEL 0.35 *** 0.53 *** -0.37 ***
Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 9. Estimation of the internal HBS (bb_02)
MODEL bb_02: 
dependent variable: RP2
explanatory variables PRO2
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (16/12) 0.35 * -0.69 ***
CZE (40/36) 0.61 *** -0.54 ***
EST (44/40) 0.95 *** -0.25 **
LIT (36/32) 0.84 *** -0.29 ***
POL (36/32) 1.29 *** -0.16 ***
ROM (24/20) -0.41 ***
SLK (36/32) 0.18 -0.12 **
PANEL 0.55 *** 0.56 *** -0.43 ***
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 11. Estimation of the internal HBS (hbs_01)
MODEL hbs_01: 
dependent variable: RER1
explanatory variables RPRO1
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (16/12) 0.41 -0.41 **
CZE (40/36) 0.19 -0.09 *
EST (44/40) 0.30 -0.12 ***
LIT (36/32) -3.31 ** -0.07 *
POL (36/32) -1.09 ** -0.10 *
ROM (24/20) -0.75 ** -0.28 ***
SLK (36/32) 0.75 ** -0.15
PANEL -0.50 0.27 -0.18 ***
Notes: Variable significant at 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 10. Estimation of the internal HBS (bb_03)
MODEL bb_03: 
dependent variable: RP3
explanatory variables PRO1
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (11/9) -0.51 0.15 *
CZE (40/38) 0.79 * -0.01
EST (39/37) 2.11 ** -0.05 ***
HUN (36/34) 1.14 *** 0.02
LIT (32/30) 1.82 *** -0.15 ***
POL (36/34) 1.22 *** 0.02 *
ROM (24/22) 0.12 0.10 **
SLK (36/34) 0.66 0.00
SLO (22/20) 1.10 *** 0.01
PANEL 0.94 *** 2.53 *** 0.01
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 12. Estimation of the internal HBS (hbs_02)
MODEL hbs_02: 
dependent variable: RER1
explanatory variables RPRO2
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (16/12) -0.50
CZE (40/36) -0.38 -0.09 *
EST (44/40) -4.01 -0.12 ***
LIT (36/32) -2.94 * -0.07 **
POL (36/32) -0.78 -0.12 **
ROM (24/20) -0.70 * -0.28 **
SLK (36/32) 0.20 -0.10
PANEL -1.30 *** -0,14 -0.26 **
Notes: Variable significant at 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in
Appendix II. For sources and definitions see section 4.1 and Appendix I.
Table 13. Estimation of the internal HBS (hbs_03)
MODEL hbs_03: 
dependent variable: RP
explanatory variables PRO1
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (11/9) 0.21 -0.21 **
CZE (40/38) 0.15 -0.06
EST (39/37) 0.46 -0.09 ***
HUN (36/34) -1.68 ** -0.02
LIT (32/30) -3.16 ** -0.08 *
POL (36/34) -1.23 ** -0.14 **
ROM (24/22) -0.54 * -0.81 ***
SLK (36/34) 0.88 * -0.01
SLO (22/20) -1.09 ***
PANEL -0.67 *** -0,86 *** -0.21 **
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Note: Methodological details in section 6.3.
Table 14. Estimation of the internal HBS (hbs_04)
MODEL hbs_04: 
dependent variable: RP2
explanatory variables PRO2
FULLY MODIFIED
OLS  (FMOLS)
POOLED MEAN GROUP ESTIMATES 
(PMGE)
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Long-Run 
Coefficients
Error Correction 
Coefficients
COUNTRY
(#obsFMOLS/#
obsPMGE)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
BUL (11/9) 0.36 -0.56 ***
CZE (40/38) -0.39 -0.11 **
EST (39/37) -3.56 ** -0.09 ***
HUN (36/34) -2.22 ** -0.02
LIT (32/30) -2.72 ** -0.07 **
POL (36/34) -0.83 -0.10 *
ROM (24/22) -0.46 -0.29 **
SLK (36/34) 0.01 -0.03
SLO (22/20) -0.70 ***
PANEL -1.17 *** -0.41 *** -0.25 **
Note: Methodological details in section 6.3.
Table 15. The contribution of the HBS effect to annual dynamics of GVA deflator in CEECs
(average annual percentage changes over indicated periods)  
Period BUL CZE EST LIT POL ROM SLK
96-99 20.62 7.23 12.57 9.34 12.87 42.15 5.76
       DEF (actual)
00-03 3.59 3.21 4.22 0.49 3.57 31.70 5.29
MODEL
Elasticity
Produced
by
HBS Cntribution:
96-99 0.74 0.67 0.89 1.77 -0.81 0.10
FMOLS
00-03 0.73 0.21 1.55 0.71 0.95 -0.42 0.12
96-99 1.20 0.97 1.27 2.48 -0.56 0.19
bb_01
PMGE
00-03 0.87 0.39 2.35 1.14 1.43 -0.06 0.20
96-99 1.79 1.05 1.28 3.03 -0.24 0.92
bb_02
both 
methods 00-03 -0.05 0.40 1.92 1.42 0.69 0.98 0.66
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Note: Methodological details in section 6.3.
Table 16. The contribution of the HBS effect to CPI inflation in CEECs (average annual
percentage changes over indicated periods)  
Period BUL CZE EST HUN LIT POL ROM SLK SLO
96-99 344.31 7.53 11.38 16.55 9.94 13.46 74.92 7.30 8.08
CPI (actual)
00-03 6.43 2.63 3.67 7.22 0.47 4.55 29.76 7.85 7.59
Model
Elasticity
Produced
by
HBS CONTRIBUTION:
96-99 1.44 0.92 0.94 0.53 1.52 2.23 0.31 0.90
bb_03 FMOLS
00-03 -0.73 0.66 2.66 0.81 0.68 1.17 0.78 0.51 1.30
Note: Methodological details in section 6.3.
Table 17. The contribution of the HBS effect to the appreciation of the real exchange rate
(average annual percentage changes over indicated periods)  
Period BUL CZE EST HUN LIT POL ROM SLK SLO
96-99 -3.05 -2.66 -7.17 -1.58 -10.53 -2.44 -1.85 -0.89 0.70
RER2 (actual)
00-03 -5.52 -5.33 -2.43 -6.06 -5.02 -2.27 -3.94 -8.13 -2.07
Model
Elasticity
Produced
by
HBS CONTRIBUTION:
96-99 0.00 -1.88 -0.60 -1.83 -1.25 -2.93 -1.22 0.34 -1.82
FMOLS
00-03 -0.24 -0.04 -3.05 -0.95 -1.40 -1.49 -1.41 0.53 -0.92
96-99 0.00 -2.41 -0.77 -2.35 -1.60 -3.76 -1.56 0.44 -2.34
HBS3
PMGE
00-03 -0.31 -0.05 -3.92 -1.22 -1.80 -1.91 -1.81 0.68 -1.18
96-99 -1.53 -0.23 -0.78 -0.51 -2.10 1.59 -0.32 -1.99
PMGE
00-03 0.17 -0.03 -1.37 -0.54 -1.12 -0.09 -1.47 -0.18 -0.72
96-99 -4.37 -0.66 -2.22 -1.45 -6.00 4.53 -0.92 -5.67
HBS4
FMOLS
00-03 0.50 -0.10 -3.92 -1.54 -3.19 -0.26 -4.21 -0.51 -2.05
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in section
7.2.
Table 18. Group Mean FMOLS estimates of the elasticities in 2 subpanels 
Observations with commit=0 Observations with commit=1
BB MODELS BB MODELS
Model coefficient model coefficient
bb_01r0 0.15 *** bb_01r1 0.36 ***
bb_02r0 0.50 *** bb_02r1 0.33 **
bb_03r0 0.81 *** bb_03r1 0.47 ***
HBS MODELS HBS MODELS
model coeffiecient model coeffiecient
hbs_01r0 -0.58 hbs_01r1 0.13
hbs_02r0 -1.27 * hbs_02r1 0.25
hbs_03r0 -0.67 hbs_03r1 -0.35 **
hbs_04r0 -1.00 hbs_03r1 -0.32 **
Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in section
7.2.
Table 19. Internal HBS with regime dummies (bb_01)
BB_01:  dependent  var iable :  RP1
Ordinary model Models with regime dummies
coeff coeff
Fixed-effects (within) regression
pro1 0.65 *** pro1 0.64 ***
commit 0.00
Random-effects GLS regression
pro1 0.65 pro1 0.64 ***
commit 0.01
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
pro1 0.37 *** pro1 0.34 ***
commit 0.02 *
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
pro1 0.62 *** pro1 0.61 ***
commit 0.02 ***
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in section
7.2.
Table 20. Internal HBS with regime dummies
BB_02:  dependent  var iable :  RP2
Ordinary model Models with regime dummies
coeff coeff
Fixed-effects (within) regression
pro2 0.67 *** pro2 0.68 ***
commit 0.00
Random-effects GLS regression
pro2 0.56 *** pro2 0.32 ***
commit 0.03 ***
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
pro2 0.03 pro2 -0.09 **
commit 0.05 ***
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
pro2 -0.34 *** pro2 -0.31 ***
commit 0.10 ***
Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in section
7.2.
Table 21. Internal HBS with regime dummies (bb_03)
BB_03:  dependent  var iable :  RP3
Ordinary model Models with regime dummies
coeff coeff
Fixed-effects (within) regression
pro1 0.93 *** pro1 0.74 ***
commit 0.11 ***
Random-effects GLS regression
pro1 0.90 *** pro1 0.74 ***
commit 0.10 ***
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
pro1 0.00 pro1 0.04
commit 0.01
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
pro1 0.41 *** pro1 0.43 ***
commit -0.06 ***
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Notes: Variable significant at a 10% (*), 5%(**) or 1%(***) significance level. Methodological details in section
7.2.
Table 22. External HBS with regime dummies (hbs_03)
BB_03:  dependent  var iable :  RP3
Ordinary model Models with regime dummies
coeff coeff
Fixed-effects (within) regression
pro1 0.93 *** pro1 0.74 ***
commit 0.11 ***
Random-effects GLS regression
pro1 0.90 *** pro1 0.74 ***
commit 0.10 ***
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
pro1 0.00 pro1 0.04
commit 0.01
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
pro1 0.41 *** pro1 0.43 ***
commit -0.06 ***
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Note: PRO are ratios of productivity in tradables to productivity in nontradables;
For sources and definitions see Section 4.1 and Appendix I
Figure 1. Relative productivity indices in CEECs, 2003:Q4=100
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Note: RP are ratios of the price level of nontradables relative to the price level of tradables, 
For sources and definitions see Section 4.1 and Appendix I
Figure 2. Relative price indices in CEECs, 2002:Q1=100
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Note: RER1 - deflated with GVA deflators, RER2 - deflated with CPI
For sources and definitions see Section 4.1 and Appendix I
Figure 3. Real exchange rate indices in CEE, 2003:Q4=100
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Figure 4. Sectoral division problems - diagram illustration
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Note: EUR_xxx denotes nominal euro exchange rate
RER3_xxx denotes real euro exchange rate deflated by producer prices in manufacturing 
Figure 6.1. Indices of nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate deflated by producer prices
in manufacturing (BUL, CZE, EST, HUN. LAT, LIT); 2002:Q1=100
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Note: EUR_xxx denotes nominal euro exchange rate
RER3_xxx denotes real euro exchange rate deflated by producer prices in manufacturing
Figure 6.2. Indices of nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate deflated by producer prices
in manufacturing (POL, ROM, SLK, SLO); 2002:Q1=100
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Appendix I. Data sources and definitions
The following variables are calculated for each country separately. 
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Name Definition Source
P_Ti Value Added Deflator for tradables (i=1,2 indicate two 
alternative definitions of the sector, see note below) 
Eurostat
P_NT Value Added Deflator for nontradables Eurostat
DEF Deflator of Gross Value Added Eurostat
CPI_NT CPI prices of services (definition differs across countries) MEI-OECD and 
national sources
PPIM Producer price index for manufacturing (with exception of BUL) IFS-IMF and 
national sources
RPi
TiP
NTP
_
_ ; prices of nontradables relative to tradables (i=1,2 
indicate two alternative definitions of the sector, see note below)
RP3
PPIM
NTCPI _
 ; relative prices (non-tradables vs. tradables)
EUR Nominal exchange rate: domestic currency per unit of the euro
(increase = depreciation)
IFS-IMF
RER1
xxxDEF
EUDEFxxxEUR
_
_*_
Real exchange rate of the euro deflated 
by gross value added deflators 
RER2
xxxCPI
EUCPIxxxEUR
_
_*_
 Real exchange rate of the euro deflated by CPI 
RER3
xxxPPIM
EUPPIxxxEUR
_
_*_
 Real exchange rate of the euro deflated 
by the PPI in manufacturing
VA_Ti Value added at constant prices in the tradable sector (i=1,2 
indicate two alternative definitions of the sector, see note below)
Eurostat
VA_NT  Value added at constant prices in the non-tradable sector Eurostat
EMP_Ti Employment in the tradable sector (i=1,2 indicate two 
alternative definitions of the sector, see note below)
Eurostat
EMP_NT Employment in the non-tradable sector Eurostat
PRO_Ti
TiEMP
TiVA
_
_ ; productivity in the tradable sector (i=1,2 indicate 
two alternative definitions of the sector, see note below)
PRO_NT
NTEMP
NTVA
_
_ ; productivity in the non-tradable sector
PROi
NTPRO
TiPRO
_
_ ; relative productivity (tradables vs. non-tradables) 
(i=1,2 indicate two alternative definitions of the sector, see note 
below)
RPROi
EURPROi
xxxPROi
_
_ ; relative productivity (tradables vs. non-tradables) 
in country xxx relative to the euro zone (i=1,2 indicate two alter
native definitions of the sector, see note below)
The euro-zone data is collected from the ECB's monthly bulletin and OECD databases.
Two alternative definitions of the sectoral division are as follows:
1)with the subscript '1' where the tradable sector comprises industry only, i.e.
sections C, D and E of the NACE59 classification of the economic activity (mining
and quarrying, manufacturing industries as well as electricity, gas and water
supply),
2) with the subscript '2' where the tradable sector comprises industry as well as
agriculture, forestry and fishing, i.e. sections A, B, C, D and E of the NACE
classification of the economic activity.
Country abbreviations:
BUL – Bulgaria, CZE – the Czech Republic, EST – Estonia, HUN – Hungry, LAT –
Lithuania, LIT – Lithuania, POL – Poland, SLO – Slovenia, SLK – the Slovak Republic,
and EUR – the euro zone.
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59 NACE  is the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community compatible with ISIC - the
International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities.
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Appendix II. Methodological notes
Panel Unit Root Tests 
Consider a panel equation of y:
(II-1)   
where:
zit is the deterministic component in the model and can take the form of the constant, time
trend, etc. 
eit are IID(0,σe
2)
The first-difference form the above equation can be written as follows:
(II-2)   
where ρi*=ρi -1
The IPS test (Im et al., 2002) involves testing for unit roots by means of the standardized
t-statisic based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics averages across all groups. Thus,
the group-specific ńi as well as the number of lags pi are allowed to vary across different
groups. The test hypotheses are as follows:
H0: ρi*=0 for all i’s
H1: ρi*<0 for at least one group. 
Thus, under the null hypothesis series in all groups contain a unit root and under an
alternative there is at least one series that is stationary.
In contrast, the Levin-Linn tests (Harris and Sollis, 2003) require that ρi=ρ for all i’s.
Specific forms of the test vary with respect to imposing homogeneity on the number of lags
and coefficients in the autoregressive and deterministic component of equation II-2.
Therefore the test hypotheses are:
H0: ρ*=0
H1: ρ*<0. 
Thus, under the null hypothesis series in all i groups contain a unit root and the alternative
is that all i series are stationary. Clearly, the LL test is therefore, far more restrictive than
the IPS test. 
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Table 4 contains 6 different versions of the LL test that differ with respect to the form of
the deterministic component matrix, z and to imposing homogeneity on the number of lags
and/or equality of autoregressive coefficients. There are 2 versions of the IPS test: one
including a trend and another one without a trend.
Panel cointegration tests
Panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) involve estimating the panel
cointegration regression of the general fully unrestricted form:
(II-3)   
where 
t=1,…,T refers to the number of observations over time
i =1,..,N refers to the number of individual members of the panel and 
m=1,…,M refers to the number of regression variables.
Tests of the null hypothesis of no cointegration are based on the residuals estimated
using:
(II-4) 
There are several alternative forms of the test (see table 7) depending on the way the
dynamics are taken into account to correct for serial correlations (Harris and Sollis,
2003). In addition, two modes of estimating equation II-3 are considered. Panel statistics
involve pooling the data within-dimension, whereas group statistics are averages of group-
specific statistics (analogous to group-means FMOLS estimates discussed below).  As a
consequence the alternative hypotheses vary in these two types of tests. While the null
hypothesis for both of them is the hypothesis of no cointegration, the alternative
hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: ρi=ρ <1  for all i’s for panel statistics
H1: ρi<1  for all i’s (allowing for heterogeneity of coefficients) for group statistics 
The exact formulas for the test statistics are given in Pedroni (1999, pp. 660-661).
The test statistics have been standardized by Pedroni (1999) who also provided appropriate
critical values. Under the alternative hypothesis, the panel variance statistics diverges to
positive infinity, while for all the other six tests, test statistic diverge to negative infinitity. 
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Group-Means Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (Group-Means
FMOLS)60
The group means FMOLS by Pedroni (2000) involves averaging of FMOLS estimators
calculated separately for each group (country). The FMOLS procedure corrects the OLS
estimator in a semi-parametric way to eliminate bias related to the endogeneity of
regressors (contemporaniety and the failure of weak exogeneity).  
We consider a simple bivariate panel regression with N groups (i = 1,..N) and T
observations (t=1,…T):  
(II-5)   
The group means FMOLS estimator of β is given by:
(II-6) 
which is a simple average of FMOLS estimators for each individual group:
(II-7) 
And are covariances and weighted sums of covariances obtained from
long-run covariances matrix of (II-5) (for details see Pedroni, 2000).
Likewise, the group-means FMOLS t-statistics can be constructed from the within-group
FMOLS t statistics as an average of  within-group FMOLS t statistics multiplied by square
root of N. 
In the case of estimations in our paper (tables 8-14), the FMOLS procedure yields long-
run estimates in line with (II-5) estimated separately for each country as well as a panel
estimate calculated as a simple average of country-specific coefficients (in line with II-6).
Thus, group-means FMOLS allows for heterogeneity of long-run coefficients among
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60 Pedroni (2000) and Harris and Sollis (2003)
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groups (countries) which makes a panel estimate sensitive to outliers in the within-group
estimators.
Pooled Means Group Estimates  (PMGE)
The PMGE procedure due to Pesaran et al. (1999) involves estimating ARDL models as
well as their error correction representations with explicit long-run relationships. For
each group (country) in a panel, an error correction model (ECM) is estimated with a
homogeneity restriction imposed on long-run coefficients, whereas short-run coefficients
are allowed to vary and are averaged across groups. 
We consider a panel with N groups (i=1,..N) and T observations (t=1,…T) modelled by an
ARDL (p,q). If we assume that a stable, long-run relationship exists between model
variables and that long-run coefficients are restricted to be the same across groups, the
modelled relationship (with time-series observations stacked up for each group) can be
written as:
(II-8)
denotes the error correction coefficient (ECM),
∆ denotes first difference (∆yi = yi –yi,-1),
yi,-j denotes a series lagged j periods
Xi is the matrix of explanatory variables 
Wi =(∆yi,-1,…, ∆yi,-p+1, ∆Xi, ∆Xi,-1, ι)
ι =(1,…,1)’ denotes a T x 1 vector of ones.
κ - short-run coefficients on autoregressive part, X and a constant term, respectively
φi – group-specific ECM terms.
θ – common long-run parameter
Var(εit)=σi
2
Estimation of the parameters of interest (φi , θ, σi2) are done by maximising the associated
log-likelihood function. 
As II-8 suggests, the PMG estimation imposes a common long-run coefficient on the panel
and allows all short-term coefficients (ECMs as well as coefficients in κ) to vary. The name
of these estimators highlights both ‘pooling’ implied by homogeneity restrictions imposed
iζ
θθζ
εκθζφ
iii
iiiiii
Xy
where
Wy
−=
++=∆
−1,)(
)(
92
M. Błaszkiewicz, P. Kowalski, Ł. Rawdanowicz, P. Woźniak
CASE Reports No. 57
on long-run coefficients as well as the averaging across groups used to obtain means of the
estimated short-run coeffiecients.  Thus, a PMGE can be viewed as an intermediate
approach between the mean group estimator (the average of separate estimates for each
group) and fixed/random effects panel models which allow only an intercept to vary across
groups – all other coefficients and error variances are constrained to be homogenous
(Pesaran et al., 1999). 
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Appendix III. Exchange rate regimes and the HBS effect
The productivity growth differential between the tradable and non-tradable sector can
be expressed as: 
CASE Reports No. 57
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Appendix IV. Exchange rate regime classification
Despite similar economic and geo-political situation at the beginning of the transition,
different economies in Central and Eastern Europe have opted for different and completely
uncoordinated paths of improving macroeconomic stability and growth. The Czech
Republic started with a peg, widened its band in 1996 and proceeded to managed float in
1997. Hungary started with a frequently adjusted peg, adopted a crawling peg in 1995 and
moved to a crawling band in 1998, so as to finally broaden this band to +/- 15% in 2001.
Poland started with the adjustable peg in 1990, moved to a crawling peg in 1991, which was
converted into the crawling band in 1995, bands of which were gradually widened in 1998-
1999 finally resulting in adoption of a fully floating exchange rate regime in 2000. Estonia
had a currency board from 1992. Lithuania and Bulgaria, on the other hand, started with
floating rates to retreat to currency boards in 1994 and 1997 respectively. 
This wide range of choices revealed different starting points (e.g. availability of monetary
reserves) and different macroeconomic conditions: differentials in the levels of credibility
of monetary authorities; diverse degrees of the need for effective macroeconomic
stabilisation (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002); different initial inflation developments; or finally
different structures of the real sector, which may have resulted in different lobbying
patterns. An analytical classification of exchange rate regimes into floating, intermediate
and fixed exchange rate regime used in this paper builds on Kowalski et al. (2003) and is
included in the Appendix III. In practical implementation, the differences between the
exchange rate polices have been less pronounced. Fixers had to change the official parity
or widen the permissible bands of fluctuations and floaters frequently intervened in the
exchange rate markets. 
In classifying the regimes, one possibility is to follow a de jure classification based on the
public declarations made by each countries’ authorities. Such information is also
provided, for instance, by the IMF (1999), which distinguishes eight categories, ranging
from the adoption of another currency (dollarisation, euroisation) to an independent float.
However, it is widely known that de facto regimes often differ from officially declared
regimes (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
The differences between declarations and reality have stimulated efforts to find
algorithmic methods for classifying regimes based on available data (usual parameters
include nominal exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates). Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2002) undertook such an approach and provided a classification of
exchange rate regimes for a large set of countries. Such methods, however, also have
drawbacks and in particular cases may fail to provide realistic descriptions. Ghosh, Gulde
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and Wolf (2002) propose a “consensus” classification based on the de jure classification
eliminating cases where the actual exchange rate behavior is markedly different from
official classification. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) base their “natural classification’ on the
actual behavior of exchange rates. The latter approach does not however distinguish
between the case where exchange rate behavior is a result of shocks affecting the economy
and authorities’ attempts to affect the exchange rate movements. Maliszewska and
Maliszewski (2004) use both these classification in an investigation of stability and
inflation properties of various exchange rate regimes and compare the results between the
two classifications. 
Overall, however, the approach chosen should reflect the angle taken in the particular
study.  Given the relatively small and specific sample of countries that are of interest in
this project, combined with the need for classification on a quarterly basis a modified
version of the classification provided in Kowalski, Paczynski and Rawdanowicz (2003) is
used. This classification comprises three exchange rate regimes (peg, intermediate and
float) and reflects information on both official declarations made by monetary authorities
(an overview can be found in de Souza, 2002) and data from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2002). In the opinion of authors of these classification such an approach provides a good
description of the de facto exchange rate regimes pursued by the group of CEE countries
in the period 1994-2002 (see Appendix III). By necessity this classification is to some
extent arbitrary. First of all, classification of Slovakian and Czech fixed but adjustable
regimes at the beginning of the period as fixed, and thereby analytically equivalent to
currency boards in Estonia and Lithuania, may be considered problematic. Secondly, the
current exchange rate regime in Slovakia is classified as managed floating according to
the IMF definition and as floating in the discussed classification. As discussed in Kowalski
(2003) the incidence of fixed exchange rates is concentrated at the beginning of the sample
and the incidence of the floating exchange rates at the end of the sample. This may pose
some problems with interpretation of econometric results. In particular, some effects
characteristic for the beginning of transition process may be incorrectly interpreted as
consequences of fixed exchange rate regime and effects characteristic of later stages of
transition as a consequence of floating exchange rate regime. 
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